hono
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed4.12.16(semver)
Fixed versions
4.12.16
Fix
- Fixed version
4.12.16npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-44456
Hono: bodyLimit() can be bypassed for chunked / unknown-length requests
Summary
bodyLimit() does not reliably enforce maxSize for requests without a usable Content-Length (e.g. Transfer-Encoding: chunked). Oversized requests can reach handlers and return 200 instead of 413.
Details
For chunked / unknown-length requests, bodyLimit() wraps the body in a stream that counts bytes asynchronously, then runs the handler before the size decision is final. The 413 is only applied afterwards by checking c.error.
This lets the limit be bypassed when:
try/catch.In all three cases the handler returns 200 before the limit check completes (or its result is observed).
The fix is to enforce the size decision before next() runs, instead of retrofitting the response via c.error afterwards.
Impact
Applications relying on bodyLimit() as a hard boundary can be bypassed: oversized chunked requests can reach handler logic and return successful responses. Per-request data exposure is bounded by maxSize, but the documented guarantee — "oversized requests are rejected before business logic runs" — does not hold.
Credits
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 4.12.16 (semver)4.12.16
4.12.16npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0