tornado
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed6.5.9(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
6.5.9
Fix
- Fixed version
6.5.9pip install --upgrade tornado==6.5.9
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-103263
Tornado: StaticFileHandler follows symlinks outside static root (path traversal)
Summary
StaticFileHandler allows an unauthenticated attacker to read arbitrary files from the server's filesystem by requesting a path that resolves to a symbolic link placed inside the static root directory. Any application that serves user-uploadable content, or whose static directory is populated by a build/deploy pipeline that creates symlinks (e.g. npm link, webpack, Docker volume mounts, CDN sync tools), is affected. An attacker who can trigger the creation of a symlink pointing outside the static root—or exploit one that already exists—can retrieve sensitive files such as /etc/passwd, private keys, configuration files, or application secrets.
Details
The vulnerability is in tornado.web.StaticFileHandler, specifically in the interaction between two methods in [tornado/web.py](vscode-webview://1grdaaa6v64itrol06qu70pq3d1b9h9im5c3npvvc9snaprc1q9f/tornado/web.py):
os.path.abspath() to resolve the requested path:os.path.abspath() on the root, then performs a string prefix check:os.path.abspath() normalises . and .. segments but does not resolve symbolic links. As a result, a path like /var/www/static/link passes the startswith("/var/www/static/") check regardless of where link actually points.
Immediately after, os.path.exists() and os.path.isfile() do follow symlinks, so the file they ultimately open is the symlink's target. The fix would be to replace os.path.abspath() with os.path.realpath() in both methods, so the resolved real path of the symlink target is validated against the root, not just its string representation inside the static directory.
PoC
_Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability._
Prerequisites: Python 3.x, Tornado installed.
mkdir -p /tmp/static
echo "DB_PASSWORD=s3cr3t" > /tmp/secret.conf
ln -s /tmp/secret.conf /tmp/static/config.conf
import tornado.web, tornado.ioloop
app = tornado.web.Application([
(r"/static/(.*)", tornado.web.StaticFileHandler, {"path": "/tmp/static"}),
])
app.listen(8888)
tornado.ioloop.IOLoop.current().start()
curl http://localhost:8888/static/config.conf
Impact
Any application using StaticFileHandler is potentially affected if:
An unauthenticated remote attacker can read any file readable by the process user: application secrets, private TLS keys, database credentials, /etc/shadow, SSH keys, or source code (depending on the process's filesystem permissions).
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 6.5.9 (ecosystem)6.5.9
6.5.9pip install --upgrade tornado==6.5.9Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0