getgrav/grav
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.0.0-beta.2(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
2.0.0-beta.2
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-42842
Grav Vulnerable to XSS via Taxonomy Field Values in Admin Panel
Summary
A Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in the Grav CMS Form plugin's select field template. Taxonomy tag and category values are rendered with the Twig |raw filter in the admin panel, bypassing the global autoescape protection. An editor-level user can inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes in any administrator's browser session when they view or edit any page in the admin panel.
Additionally, Grav's built-in XSS detection (Security::detectXss()) can be bypassed by using payloads that close the <option>/<select> context and use unquoted event handlers - the on_events regex fails to match event handlers without quotes or trailing spaces before >.
Important
select.html.twig), which is installed by default with GravHttpOnly flag on session cookies prevents direct session theft, but the XSS can steal the admin nonce and perform privileged actions via JavaScriptPermissions Needed
Details
The Form plugin's select field template renders option values using the |raw Twig filter, which outputs content without HTML escaping:
File: user/plugins/form/templates/forms/fields/select/select.html.twig
{# Line 55 #}
avalue|raw
{# Line 65 #}
suboption|t|raw
{# Line 72 #}
item_value|t|raw
The taxonomy field in the page editor uses this select template. When a page has taxonomy values (tags, categories), these values are populated as <option> elements in the select dropdown. The value attribute is properly escaped by the browser's attribute encoding, but the display text between <option> tags is rendered raw:
<option value="<script>alert(1)</script>"><script>alert(1)</script></option>
Since taxonomy options are collected globally across all pages (to provide autocomplete/selection), a malicious taxonomy value on any page will appear in the taxonomy dropdown of every page editor - making this a cross-page stored XSS.
The server-side field restriction in the flex-objects plugin only blocks ['form', 'forms', 'process', 'twig'] for non-super users. Taxonomy fields are not restricted, so editors can freely set arbitrary taxonomy values.
XSS Detection Bypass
Grav's Security::detectXss() checks for dangerous_tags (e.g., <script>, <iframe>), on_events (event handlers), and invalid_protocols (e.g., javascript:). However, the on_events regex:
'on_events' => '#(<[^>]+[a-z\x00-\x20"\'\/)(?:on[a-z]+)\s*=[\s|\'"'].*[\s|\'"']>#iUu'
requires either quotes around the handler value or a trailing space before >. An unquoted handler like onerror=alert(1)> (no space before >) bypasses this check entirely.
Combined with </option></select> to break out of the select context (neither tag is in dangerous_tags), the full payload evades all three detection layers and triggers no XSS warning in the admin panel.
PoC
Step 1: Login as Editor
Navigate to http://TARGET/admin/ and authenticate with editor credentials.
Step 2: Create a Page with Malicious Taxonomy
XSS via editor</option></select><img src=x onerror=alert('XSS-via-editor')>
This payload:
</option></select> to break out of the select dropdown context<img> tag with an unquoted onerror handler (bypasses on_events regex)dangerous_tags list (no <script>, <iframe>, etc.)<img width="1221" height="857" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6223cbb2-f04b-46bd-89ce-828c89ad77ab" />
Step 3: Trigger the XSS
When any administrator navigates to the page editor of any page (not just the malicious one), the JavaScript executes immediately.
<img width="1224" height="856" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f008b0f2-dedb-4b22-a74a-cdc0d7325cb4" />
The XSS fires because taxonomy tag options are collected globally across all pages and rendered with |raw in the select dropdown template. The payload breaks out of the <option> context, and the browser renders the <img> tag as a regular DOM element.
Impact
HttpOnly prevents direct cookie theft, the XSS can steal the admin nonce token and perform any admin action via AJAX requests---
Maintainer note — fix applied (2026-04-24)
Fixed across two repos:
|raw filters in `templates/forms/fields/select/select.html.twig` (placeholder, avalue, suboption, item_value) have been removed. Option labels — including taxonomy values that propagate cross-page through the admin's shared selection pool — now go through Twig's default escaper, so a lower-privileged editor can no longer inject script that runs in an admin's browser when they open any page editor.on_events regex in Security::detectXss() is tightened so unquoted handlers like onerror=alert(1)> are flagged (see separate GHSA-9695-8fr9-hw5q), and option/select have been added to default security.xss_dangerous_tags so </option></select>… tripwires the detector (see separate GHSA-w8cg-7jcj-4vv2).Sites running admin2 on Grav 2.0.0-beta.2 get the 9.0.1 form plugin automatically via its existing dependency graph.
Files:
|raw removed.on_events regex tightened.Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 2.0.0-beta.2 (ecosystem)2.0.0-beta.2
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0