nuxt-og-image
Affected
- introduced
6.2.5, fixed6.4.9(semver)
Fixed versions
6.4.9
Fix
- Fixed version
6.4.9npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-44589
nuxt-og-image SSRF — bypass of GHSA-pqhr-mp3f-hrpp / v6.2.5 fix (IPv6 + redirect)
Summary
The isBlockedUrl() denylist introduced in [email protected] to remediate GHSA-pqhr-mp3f-hrpp (Dmitry Prokhorov / Positive Technologies, March 2026) is incomplete. The patch advisory states "Decimal/hexadecimal IP encoding bypasses are also handled" — that part is true (Node's WHATWG URL parser canonicalizes those forms before validation), but the v6.2.5 implementation misses two independent surfaces in the latest release 6.4.8:
bare === "::1" || startsWith("fc") || startsWith("fd") || startsWith("fe80"). It misses:[::ffff:7f00:1] — IPv6-mapped IPv4 loopback in pure-hex form (RE_MAPPED_V4 regex requires dotted-quad). Reaches 127.0.0.1 on a single-stack-IPv4 host with no other primitive needed.[fec0::/10] (RFC 3879 site-local — deprecated but still routable on legacy networks)[5f00::/16] (RFC 9602 SRv6 SIDs)[3fff::/20] (RFC 9637 IPv6 documentation v2)[64:ff9b:1::/48] (RFC 8215 NAT64 local-use, including embedded IPv4 loopback [64:ff9b:1::7f00:1])isBlockedUrl runs once on the initial <img src>. The subsequent $fetch(decodedSrc, ...) (ofetch, default redirect-follow) follows 30x responses with no second-pass validation. Any allowed origin that returns a 302 to an internal IP — S3 redirect rules, GCS, Azure, CloudFront, any user-content CDN where the attacker can place a single redirect — completes the SSRF.The net result is that the v6.2.5 SSRF advisory is bypassable in two distinct ways. The same root family as #29 / #38 (ipx) but in a different code path with different gaps — nuxt-og-image does not delegate to ipx, it ships its own validator, and that validator has fresh issues that survived the prior fix.
Affected
| Package | Version | Role |
|------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| nuxt-og-image | 6.4.8 (latest) | default OG-image generator for Nuxt apps |
| @nuxtjs/og-image (alias) | same | re-export, same code path |
The vulnerable code lives in dist/runtime/server/og-image/core/plugins/imageSrc.js and is enforced for every <img src> (and style="background-image: url(...)") inside an OG image component, on production builds (!import.meta.dev).
Vulnerable code (imageSrc.js, verbatim)
function isPrivateIPv4(a, b) {
if (a === 127) return true;
if (a === 10) return true;
if (a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) return true;
if (a === 192 && b === 168) return true;
if (a === 169 && b === 254) return true;
if (a === 0) return true;
return false;
}
function isBlockedUrl(url) {
let parsed;
try { parsed = new URL(url); } catch { return true; }
if (parsed.protocol !== "http:" && parsed.protocol !== "https:") return true;
const hostname = parsed.hostname.toLowerCase();
const bare = hostname.replace(RE_IPV6_BRACKETS, "");
if (bare === "localhost" || bare.endsWith(".localhost")) return true;
const mappedV4 = bare.match(RE_MAPPED_V4); // /^::ffff:(\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)$/
const ip = mappedV4 ? mappedV4[1] : bare;
const parts = ip.split(".");
if (parts.length === 4 && parts.every((p) => RE_DIGIT_ONLY.test(p))) {
/* dotted-decimal IPv4 path */
}
if (RE_INT_IP.test(ip)) {
/* single-integer IPv4 path */
}
if (bare === "::1" || bare.startsWith("fc") || bare.startsWith("fd") || bare.startsWith("fe80"))
return true; // ← gap: only 4 IPv6 prefixes
return false; // ← everything else is "public"
}
// Then:
async function doResolveSrcToBuffer(src, kind, ctx) {
...
if (!import.meta.dev && isBlockedUrl(decodedSrc)) {
return { blocked: true };
}
const buffer = await $fetch(decodedSrc, { // ← follows 30x by default
responseType: "arrayBuffer",
timeout: fetchTimeout,
});
...
}
Two distinct issues:
fc, fd, fe80, ::1) and inherits no taxonomy from ipaddr.js or any RFC table.fetch() with default redirect: "follow". The validator does not run on the redirect target.Reproducer (verbatim, no host privilege)
End-to-end test of isBlockedUrl on a corpus of internal-IP forms, paired with empirical fetch() confirming which forms actually reach loopback. Verbatim output:
isBlockedUrl? fetch reaches loopback? url
------------- ----------------------- ---
✓ blocked YES http://127.0.0.1:8765/ (control: dotted-decimal loopback)
✓ blocked YES http://localhost:8765/ (control)
✓ blocked no(ECONNREFUSED) http://[::1]:8765/ (control: IPv6 loopback)
✓ blocked no(EHOSTUNREACH) http://169.254.169.254:8765/ (control: AWS IMDS)
✓ blocked YES http://2130706433:8765/ (control: decimal-int IPv4)
✓ blocked YES http://0x7f000001:8765/ (control: hex-int IPv4)
✓ blocked YES http://0177.0.0.1:8765/ (control: octal — URL parser canonicalizes)
✓ blocked YES http://127.1:8765/ (control: shorthand — URL parser canonicalizes)
✗ NOT blocked YES http://[::ffff:7f00:1]:8765/ (BYPASS: IPv6-mapped, hex form)
✗ NOT blocked no(unreachable) http://[fec0::1]:8765/ (BYPASS: RFC 3879 site-local)
✗ NOT blocked no(unreachable) http://[5f00::1]:8765/ (BYPASS: RFC 9602 SRv6)
✗ NOT blocked no(unreachable) http://[3fff::1]:8765/ (BYPASS: RFC 9637 docs)
✗ NOT blocked no(unreachable) http://[64:ff9b:1::1]:8765/ (BYPASS: RFC 8215 NAT64)
✗ NOT blocked no(unreachable) http://[64:ff9b:1::7f00:1]:8765/ (BYPASS: NAT64 + embedded loopback)
The first six bypass rows say "✗ NOT blocked" — that is isBlockedUrl returning false (i.e., "this URL is fine to fetch") for each of those addresses. The "fetch reaches loopback" column shows that [::ffff:7f00:1] actually round-trips to 127.0.0.1 on a single-stack-IPv4 dev box; the four cluster ranges are unreachable on the dev box but succeed on dual-stack / k8s / NAT64 / SRv6 networks where any of these prefixes is internally bound.
The "control" rows confirm the bypass set is minimal — the validator catches the obvious cases. The bypasses are the cases the prefix list forgot.
Class 2: redirect amplifier
$fetch(url, { responseType: "arrayBuffer", timeout }) follows 30x by default. Confirmed empirically — ofetch('http://lab.menna.website/test/redirect-to-loopback') (where lab.menna.website returns 302 Location: http://127.0.0.1/) ends with <no response> fetch failed after the connect attempt to 127.0.0.1:80, proving the redirect was followed. On a target where the redirect destination has a service bound, the bytes round-trip back through the OG renderer.
Low Basis: The source's own band: LOW
6.2.5, fixed 6.4.9 (semver)6.4.9
6.4.9npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0