Details
[*] target=http://localhost:9999 nick=victim threads=32
[ 2.2s] attempts= 1094 rps= 493
[ 24.4s] attempts= 11535 rps= 473
[ 50.0s] attempts= 23420 rps= 468
[100.7s] attempts= 41247 rps= 410
[144.9s] attempts= 55418 rps= 383
[+] FOUND code=055473 after 55,773 attempts in 146.0s
[+] Cookies: fsNick=victim; fsLogkey=47qZDmjcHaS2z2pLsqKWsKbb8vlGfZaYEiUUfcvWHlDXSZlI9LFg8ux7EYX1fzTkeNSgM5ASQ7s5ohr8ROAclvlK1GCxACia21N; fsLang=en_EN
A second run terminated in 24.6 s after 11 569 attempts. Both runs used a
single source IP with no proxy rotation, no HTTP/2, no parallel hosts.
Impact
For each 2FA-enabled user (including admins):
- Confidentiality: full read access to anything the victim can see — invoices, customer data, suppliers, accounting ledgers, attached files, user PII, API keys, plugin configuration.
- Integrity: full write access — create/modify/delete records, change permissions, issue new API keys, upload plugins, install code (admin).
- Availability: targeted account lockout DoS — generating six failed 2FA attempts (≪ 1 s of brute-force noise) pushes the per-user incident counter past
MAX_INCIDENT_COUNT = 6, blocking the legitimate user fromloginActionfor 10 minutes. Repeatable indefinitely.
The vulnerability defeats the entire purpose of 2FA in FacturaScripts:
enabling 2FA on an account today is strictly *weaker* than not enabling
it, because it adds an unauthenticated, brute-forceable login path that
wasn't present before.
Remediation
Four independent fixes are required; each closes a distinct gap and any
one alone is insufficient.
- Require evidence the user just completed the password step. In
loginAction, afterverifyPasswordsucceeds and 2FA is required, write a short-lived nonce keyed by(client_ip, user_nick)to the shared cache (e.g.Cache::set("2fa-pending-{ip}-{nick}", $nonce, ttl=300)).twoFactorValidationActionmust read, validate, and delete that nonce before callingverifyTwoFactorCode. Without the nonce, return immediately.
- Call `validateFormToken($request)` at the top of `twoFactorValidationAction`. Every other action handler in the controller does this; the 2FA handler should too. Eliminates drive-by CSRF submissions.
- Call `userHasManyIncidents(Session::getClientIp(), $userName)` before doing any work in `twoFactorValidationAction`, and bail out if the threshold is exceeded. This is the missing rate-limit pre-check.
- Reduce `TwoFactorManager::VERIFICATION_WINDOW` from 8 to 1. The google2fa default is 1 (±30 s). A window of 8 multiplies the brute-force success rate by 17× for no legitimate reason — TOTP apps and the server clock are typically synchronised within a single 30-second step.
Suggested patch (illustrative):
// Core/Controller/Login.php
protected function twoFactorValidationAction(Request $request): void
{
if (false === $this->validateFormToken($request)) { // fix 2
return;
}
$userName = $request->input('fsNick');
if ($this->userHasManyIncidents(Session::getClientIp(), $userName)) { // fix 3
Tools::log()->warning('ip-banned');
return;
}
$nonceKey = '2fa-pending-' . Session::getClientIp() . '-' . $userName;
if (false === Cache::get($nonceKey)) { // fix 1
Tools::log()->warning('two-factor-no-pending-login');
$this->saveIncident(Session::getClientIp(), $userName);
return;
}
Cache::delete($nonceKey);
$user = new User();
if (!$user->load($userName) || !$user->verifyTwoFactorCode($request->input('fsTwoFactorCode'))) {
Tools::log()->warning('two-factor-code-invalid');
$this->saveIncident(Session::getClientIp(), $userName);
return;
}
$this->updateUserAndRedirect($user, Session::getClientIp(), $request);
}
// Core/Lib/TwoFactorManager.php
private const VERIFICATION_WINDOW = 1; // fix 4 — was 8
loginAction then needs the matching nonce write where it currently
sets $this->two_factor_user:
if ($user->two_factor_enabled) {
Cache::set('2fa-pending-' . Session::getClientIp() . '-' . $user->nick,
bin2hex(random_bytes(16)), 300);
$this->two_factor_user = $user->nick;
$this->template = 'Login/TwoFactor.html.twig';
return;
}
Reproduction
Tested on a clean install built from master at commit 7392b489b:
# brute force (only nick known) — secret on the server can be anything
NICK=victim THREADS=32 .venv/bin/python poc_2fa_brute.py