Details
Step 4: Root cause — kind mismatch skips CIDR check
Checking: ::ffff:169.254.169.254 against deny entry 169.254.0.0/16
parsedIp.kind() = 'ipv6'
parsedRange.kind() = 'ipv4'
kind match? = false ← CIDR check is SKIPPED!
But the IP actually maps to: 169.254.169.254 (which IS in 169.254.0.0/16)
Step 5: Proposed fix — all bypass addresses now blocked ✅
::ffff:169.254.169.254 → 🔒 BLOCKED (FIXED!) (matched: 169.254.0.0/16)
::ffff:127.0.0.1 → 🔒 BLOCKED (FIXED!) (matched: 127.0.0.0/8)
::ffff:10.0.0.1 → 🔒 BLOCKED (FIXED!) (matched: 10.0.0.0/8)
::ffff:192.168.1.1 → 🔒 BLOCKED (FIXED!) (matched: 192.168.0.0/16)
::ffff:172.16.0.1 → 🔒 BLOCKED (FIXED!) (matched: 172.16.0.0/12)
Step 6: Attack simulation
Vulnerable isDeniedIP: ⚠️ ALLOWED → Request reaches AWS metadata!
Fixed isDeniedIP: 🔒 BLOCKED → Attack prevented!
> Verification environment: Node.js v22.13.1, [email protected] (matches Flowise dependency ^2.2.0)
> PoC script: poc_ssrf_bypass.js
Impact
| Target | Impact | Severity |
|--------|--------|----------|
| AWS/GCP/Azure Metadata (169.254.169.254) | Steal IAM credentials, service account tokens | Critical |
| Internal services (10.x.x.x, 172.16.x.x, 192.168.x.x) | Access internal APIs, databases, admin panels | High |
| Localhost (127.0.0.1) | Access Flowise's own API with elevated privileges, access co-located services | High |
This bypass renders the SSRF protection added in v3.0.13 (CVE-2026-31829 fix) completely ineffective against IPv4-mapped IPv6 DNS resolution.
Remediation
Option 1: Normalize IPv4-Mapped IPv6 Before Checking (Recommended)
export function isDeniedIP(ip: string, denyList: string[]): void {
let parsedIp = ipaddr.parse(ip);
// ✅ FIX: Normalize IPv4-mapped IPv6 to IPv4 before checking
if (parsedIp.kind() === 'ipv6' && parsedIp.isIPv4MappedAddress()) {
parsedIp = parsedIp.toIPv4Address();
}
for (const entry of denyList) {
if (entry.includes('/')) {
try {
const [range, _] = entry.split('/');
let parsedRange = ipaddr.parse(range);
// Also normalize deny list entries
if (parsedRange.kind() === 'ipv6' && parsedRange.isIPv4MappedAddress()) {
parsedRange = parsedRange.toIPv4Address();
}
if (parsedIp.kind() === parsedRange.kind()) {
if (parsedIp.match(ipaddr.parseCIDR(entry))) {
throw new Error('Access to this host is denied by policy.');
}
}
} catch (error) {
throw new Error(`isDeniedIP: ${error}`);
}
} else if (ip === entry) {
throw new Error('Access to this host is denied by policy.');
}
}
}
Option 2: Add ::ffff:0:0/96 to Deny List (Defense-in-depth)
Additionally, add the IPv4-mapped IPv6 prefix to the deny list to block ALL mapped addresses:
const DEFAULT_DENY_LIST = [
// ... existing entries ...
'::ffff:0:0/96', // Block ALL IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses
'::ffff:127.0.0.1/128', // Explicit loopback mapped
'::ffff:169.254.0.0/112', // Explicit link-local mapped
'::ffff:10.0.0.0/104', // Explicit RFC1918 Class A mapped
'::ffff:172.16.0.0/108', // Explicit RFC1918 Class B mapped
'::ffff:192.168.0.0/112', // Explicit RFC1918 Class C mapped
];
Option 3: Also normalize in resolveAndValidate() (Belt and suspenders)
async function resolveAndValidate(url: string): Promise<ResolvedTarget> {
// ... existing code ...
const records = await dns.lookup(hostname, { all: true });
for (const r of records) {
let address = r.address;
// Normalize IPv4-mapped IPv6 for deny list checking
if (ipaddr.isValid(address)) {
const parsed = ipaddr.parse(address);
if (parsed.kind() === 'ipv6' && parsed.isIPv4MappedAddress()) {
address = parsed.toIPv4Address().toString();
}
}
isDeniedIP(address, denyList);
}
// ... rest of code ...
}