surrealdb
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed3.1.0(semver)
Fixed versions
3.1.0
Fix
- Fixed version
3.1.0cargo update -p surrealdb --precise 3.1.0
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-63742
SurrealDB: Field-level SELECT permissions bypassed via indexed COUNT fast paths
A record user could learn the value of a hidden field by counting how many records match a guess.
When DEFINE FIELD ... PERMISSIONS FOR select WHERE ... hides a field's contents from a caller, and that field is indexed, running SELECT count() FROM t WHERE hidden_field = "guess" GROUP ALL returned a count greater than zero whenever a record actually had that value — even though the caller was never allowed to read the field directly. The query planner used an indexed-COUNT shortcut (Index::Count, IndexCountScan, or the legacy Iterate Index Count / Iterate Index Keys paths) that counts matching index entries and skips the permission check that would normally hide the value. The same query with WITH NOINDEX correctly returned [], confirming the gap.
By repeating the count query with different guesses, an attacker can confirm or recover the contents of any restricted field they could not read through a normal SELECT.
Impact
What an attacker can do:
What it can't do:
Patches
The legacy planner (surrealdb/core/src/idx/planner/tree.rs) and the streaming planner (surrealdb/core/src/exec/planner/select/mod.rs) now both refuse the indexed fast path when the WHERE / ORDER tree references a field governed by a non-Full SELECT permission:
resolve_indexes skips any B-tree / unique index whose columns are governed by such a permission.cond_touches_restricted_field flag is propagated; eval_count refuses a dedicated Index::Count when set.cond_touches_restricted_select_field, a RestrictedIdiomChecker visitor that matches each idiom against the table's field-permission prefixes (loaded via the plan-time txn), and gates IndexCountScan emission on it.should_check_perms_for_view.Versions 3.1.0 and later are not affected.
Workarounds
Users unable to patch are advised to consider the following workarounds:
DEFINE INDEX on fields whose values are protected by field-level SELECT permissions. The class of attack is specific to the indexed fast paths.SELECT count() … GROUP ALL queries against tables containing field-protected columns.Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 3.1.0 (semver)3.1.0
3.1.0cargo update -p surrealdb --precise 3.1.0Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0