nuxt
Affected
- introduced
4.0.0, fixed4.4.7(semver)
Fixed versions
4.4.7
Fix
- Fixed version
4.4.7npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-56326, CVE-2026-56697, CVE-2026-56698
Nuxt: URL-handling weaknesses in navigateTo and reloadNuxtApp: SSR open redirect, client-side script execution via the open option, and protocol-relative bypass in reloadNuxtApp
Summary
Three weaknesses in Nuxt's client-navigation URL handling, all reachable
from documented public APIs (navigateTo and reloadNuxtApp):
navigateTo decided whether a target was external by inspecting the raw input with hasProtocol(..., { acceptRelative: true }). Inputs such as /..//evil.com, /.//evil.com, /%2e%2e//evil.com, or /app/..//evil.com slipped past that check because they start with /, but WHATWG URL parsing then normalised them to the protocol-relative pathname //evil.com. The normalised value was written to the Location response header and into the <meta http-equiv="refresh"> body of the SSR redirect page, so a victim's browser would resolve the redirect cross-origin to the attacker's host.window.open(toPath, ...) without applying the isScriptProtocol check that gates the normal navigateTo path. A target of javascript:... (or another script-capable scheme) passed to navigateTo(url, { open: { ... } }) therefore executed in the application's origin instead of being rejected.reloadNuxtApp({ path }) rejects script-capable protocols by parsing the path with new URL(path, window.location.href) and checking the resolved protocol against isScriptProtocol. Protocol-relative paths such as //evil.com resolve to the current page's protocol (https:), which passes that check; the value is then assigned to window.location.href, which the browser treats as a cross-origin redirect. This is the same protocol-relative bypass family as (1), in a different sink.Impact
For (1), the practical risk is phishing or OAuth-code theft against any
Nuxt app that forwards user-controlled input (for example a ?next=
query parameter on a login route) into navigateTo on the server. The
framework documents that navigateTo blocks external hosts unlessexternal: true is passed, so maintainers commonly rely on it as the
safe path for post-login redirects.
For (2), any app that passes a user-controlled URL intonavigateTo(url, { open: { ... } }) was vulnerable to reflected XSS in
the application's first-party origin.
For (3), any app that forwards user-controlled input intoreloadNuxtApp({ path }) could be redirected cross-origin for phishing
or OAuth-code theft, even on releases that already shipped theisScriptProtocol guard added by #35115.
Patches
Fixed in [email protected] and backported to [email protected]. The three sinks
are addressed by:
navigateTo:navigateTo({ open }) script-protocol guard:reloadNuxtApp:Workarounds
navigateTo, for example reject any input where new URL(target, 'http://localhost').pathname starts with //, or only accept a known allow-list of paths.http: and https:) before passing it to navigateTo({ open: ... }).// (or where new URL(path, window.location.href).host !== window.location.host) before passing to reloadNuxtApp({ path }).References
Credits
Reported by Anthropic / Claude as ANT-2026-S08HN6DH through Anthropic's
coordinated vulnerability disclosure programme.
The reloadNuxtApp protocol-relative bypass (sink 3) was independently
reported by @alcls01111 via GitHub's
coordinated disclosure flow (GHSA-w7fp-2cfv-4837), closed as a
duplicate of this advisory.
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
4.0.0, fixed 4.4.7 (semver)4.4.7
4.4.7npm install [email protected]3.5.0, fixed 3.21.7 (semver)3.21.7
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0