sanitize-html
Affected
- introduced
2.18.0, fixed2.18.1(semver)
Fixed versions
2.18.1
Fix
- Fixed version
2.18.1npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-113650
ApostropheCMS sanitize-html: unbounded recursion when re-sanitizing the fallback of a discarded iframe (stack overflow, nestingLimit not enforced)
Summary
Since 2.18.0, when an <iframe> is not allowed and disallowedTagsMode is 'discard' (the defaults),
its raw-text content is re-sanitized by a recursive call to sanitizeHtml(text, options) (the change
from #5564, fixing #5550). The recursion has no bound and starts each nested call with a fresh state.
Two consequences, both absent from 2.17.7 and 2.17.4:
<iframe> tags throw RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded with the default options. Any application that sanitizes untrusted HTML with 2.18.0 can be made to throw on a small crafted input.nestingLimit is not enforced across a discarded iframe: each nested iframe restarts the depth count at zero, so the output can be nested arbitrarily deep regardless of the configured limit.Affected versions
latest), and the main branch at the time of writing (the recursive call is still in packages/sanitize-html/index.js, in the ontext handler, branch tag === 'iframe' && !tagAllowed(tag) && options.disallowedTagsMode === 'discard').Tested with Node.js v26.7.0.
Reproduction 1: stack overflow with the default options
const sanitizeHtml = require('sanitize-html');
// with 2.18.0:
sanitizeHtml('<iframe>'.repeat(1000)); // 8,000 chars: returns ''
sanitizeHtml('<iframe>'.repeat(2000)); // 16,000 chars: throws RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded
sanitizeHtml('<iframe>'.repeat(20000)); // 160,000 chars: throws RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded
Results:
| input | 2.17.4 | 2.17.7 | 2.18.0 |
|---|---|---|---|
| '<iframe>'.repeat(1000) | ok | ok | ok |
| '<iframe>'.repeat(2000) | ok | ok | RangeError |
| '<iframe>'.repeat(20000) | ok | ok | RangeError |
The threshold depends on the remaining stack, so it is lower when sanitizeHtml is called from an
already deep call stack (for example inside a server-side rendering pass).
Reproduction 2: nestingLimit is bypassed
const sanitizeHtml = require('sanitize-html');
const input = ('<iframe>' + '<b>'.repeat(3)).repeat(50) + 'x';
const out = sanitizeHtml(input, { allowedTags: ['b'], nestingLimit: 3 });
// maximum nesting depth of <b> in `out`:
// 2.17.4: 2 2.17.7: 0 (fallback escaped as text) 2.18.0: 150
Without an iframe, the same options cap the output at three nested <b> in all three versions. Withk repetitions of '<iframe>' + '<b>'.repeat(3), 2.18.0 returns 3 * k nested <b> (measured for
k = 1, 5, 50: depth 3, 15, 150).
Cause
In 2.18.0 the ontext handler does:
} else if (
tag === 'iframe' &&
!tagAllowed(tag) &&
options.disallowedTagsMode === 'discard'
) {
result += sanitizeHtml(text, options);
}
Because htmlparser2 treats <iframe> as a raw-text element, the text of an unclosed iframe is the whole
remainder of the input; re-parsing it can meet another unclosed <iframe>, and so on, one stack frame
(and one full re-parse) per iframe. The nested call also starts with its own depth, so tags inside the
fallback are not counted against nestingLimit together with the enclosing tags.
Possible directions
Not a patch, only what would close both effects: bound the recursion (or process the fallback without
recursing), and carry the current depth into the nested sanitization so that nestingLimit applies to
the whole output.
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
2.18.0, fixed 2.18.1 (semver)2.18.1
2.18.1npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0