compressing
Affected
- introduced
2.0.0, fixed2.0.1(semver)
Fixed versions
2.0.1
Fix
- Fixed version
2.0.1npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-24884
Compressing Vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write via Symlink Extraction
Arbitrary File Write via Symlink Extraction in github.com/node-modules/compressing
Brief Introduction
The compressing npm package extracts TAR archives while restoring symbolic links without validating their targets.
By embedding symlinks that resolve outside the intended extraction directory, an attacker can cause subsequent file entries to be written to arbitrary locations on the host file system.
Depending on the extractor’s handling of existing files, this behavior may allow overwriting sensitive files or creating new files in security-critical locations.
Affected Component and Versions
github.com/node-modules/compressing<= 1.10.3 || =2.0.0 Vulnerability Details
Root Cause
compressing.tar.uncompress sanitizes the destination paths of archive entries, but it does not restrict or validate the targets of symlinks contained in TAR archives. During extraction, the library creates those symlinks inside the output directory. Later entries that resolve through the symlink are written to the symlink target rather than the intended extraction root, enabling an arbitrary file write.
Impact
An attacker who can supply a crafted TAR archive can:
Reproduction
Environment
Construct PoC Archive
The following pseudo-code demonstrates the attack logic:
base_dir = "archive/"
with tarfile.open("./poc_arbitrary_write.tar", mode="w") as tar:
add_regular_file(tar, base_dir + "baseFile.txt", "base content\n")
add_symlink(tar, base_dir + "myTmp", "/tmp")
add_regular_file(tar, base_dir + "myTmp/poc.txt", "Arbitrary File Write\n")
Extract the Archive
const compressing = require('compressing');
function untar(archiveName, destPath) {
return compressing.tar.uncompress(archiveName, destPath);
}
async function main() {
const archivePath = process.argv[2];
const destPath = "./output";
if (archivePath && archivePath.endsWith(".tar")) {
await untar(archivePath, destPath);
}
}
main();
Attack Results
<img width="547" height="161" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5ea12efd-0d3f-4f8a-8414-b3a5c72e153e" />
After extraction, the output directory contains a symlink pointing to /tmp. The file poc.txt is then written through the symlink to /tmp/poc.txt, demonstrating an arbitrary file write outside the extraction directory.
Summary
compressing restores symlinks from TAR archives without validating their targets. By combining a malicious symlink with a subsequent file entry, an attacker can redirect extracted files to arbitrary locations on the host.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
2.0.0, fixed 2.0.1 (semver)2.0.1
2.0.1npm install [email protected]0, fixed 1.10.4 (semver)1.10.4
1.10.4npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0