nocodb
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected0.301.3(semver)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-46552
NocoDB: Shared-base link access can invite arbitrary users as persistent base members
Summary
Shared-base sessions were granted the same base-member capabilities as authenticated viewers. Using only the shared-base UUID (xc-shared-base-id), an attacker could enumerate base members and invite an arbitrary email into the base as a real member. The invited user could then redeem the invite via the normal signup flow and retain authenticated access even after the owner revoked the shared link.
Details
Shared-base sessions were mapped to ProjectRoles.VIEWER in packages/nocodb/src/strategies/base-view.strategy/base-view.strategy.ts, and packages/nocodb/src/utils/acl.ts granted baseUserList and userInvite to that role. The shared frontend (packages/nc-gui/composables/useApi/interceptors.ts) deliberately removed auth headers in favour of the shared-base header, but the ACL middleware did not distinguish shared sessions from genuine viewers.
The end-to-end chain:
GET /api/v2/meta/bases/:baseId/users returned the member list to shared-base callers (@Acl('baseUserList')).POST /api/v2/meta/bases/:baseId/users accepted an invite from shared-base callers (@Acl('userInvite')); base-users.service.ts inserted a real nc_users_v2 row with invite_token and a nc_base_users_v2 row for the target base, with invited_by = null.users.service.ts), gaining a persistent JWT scoped to the base.Impact
Credit
This issue was reported by @0xmrma.
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, last affected 0.301.3 (semver)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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