poweradmin/poweradmin
Affected
- introduced
4.1.0, fixed4.2.5(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
4.2.5
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: None
Poweradmin: OIDC sub collation bypass in Poweradmin leading to account takeover
Preface
Poweradmin maps OIDC identities into local users through oidc_user_links.oidc_subject plus provider_id. In the MySQL schema, the OIDC link table explicitly uses utf8mb4_unicode_ci, which is case-insensitive and accent-insensitive. OIDC sub is a stable external subject identifier and should be matched byte-for-byte within the issuer/provider scope.
The confirmed local PoC used two different OIDC users:
victim-loginvictím-login (í, U+00ED)MySQL reported those two subjects as equal under utf8mb4_unicode_ci. After the victim linked their OIDC account, the attacker authenticated to the same provider with the attacker's own password and Poweradmin resolved the session to the victim's local account.
Server Info
targets/poweradmin git e1f9c9a8.4.10, character_set_server=utf8mb4, collation_server=utf8mb4_unicode_ciAffected Entry Point:
GET /oidc/login?provider=generic
GET /oidc/callback?code=...&state=...
Relevant request properties:
sub that collides with a victim's linked subsub stored and looked up as oidc_user_links.oidc_subjectRoot Cause Analysis
part0 — oidc_user_links.oidc_subject uses an accent-insensitive collation
The MySQL schema defines the OIDC link table with utf8mb4_unicode_ci:
-- sql/poweradmin-mysql-db-structure.sql:341-356
CREATE TABLE `oidc_user_links` (
`user_id` INT(11) NOT NULL,
`provider_id` VARCHAR(50) NOT NULL,
`oidc_subject` VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL,
...
UNIQUE KEY `unique_subject_provider` (`oidc_subject`, `provider_id`)
) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=utf8mb4 COLLATE=utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
In the PoC database:
Field Type Collation
provider_id varchar(50) utf8mb4_unicode_ci
oidc_subject varchar(255) utf8mb4_unicode_ci
SELECT 'victim-login' = 'victím-login' COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
-- accent_collision = 1
part1 — OIDC sub flows into a normal SQL equality lookup
Poweradmin reads the subject from OIDC userinfo data. If no custom subject mapping is configured, it uses the sub claim:
// lib/Application/Service/OidcService.php:424-459
$resourceOwner = $provider->getResourceOwner($token);
$userData = $resourceOwner->toArray();
...
subject: $userData[$mapping['subject'] ?? 'sub'] ?? '',
The callback passes the resulting OidcUserInfo to provisioning:
// lib/Application/Service/OidcService.php:269-291
$userInfo = $this->getUserInfo($provider, $token, $providerId);
$userId = $this->userProvisioningService->provisionUser($userInfo, $providerId);
Provisioning first tries to find an existing user by subject:
// lib/Application/Service/UserProvisioningService.php:86-90
$existingUserId = $authMethod === self::AUTH_METHOD_SAML
? $this->findUserBySamlSubject($userInfo->getSubject(), $providerId)
: $this->findUserByOidcSubject($userInfo->getSubject(), $providerId);
The lookup is normal SQL equality evaluated under the column's weak collation:
// lib/Application/Service/UserProvisioningService.php:145-149
$stmt = $this->db->prepare("
SELECT user_id FROM oidc_user_links
WHERE oidc_subject = ? AND provider_id = ?
");
$stmt->execute([$subject, $providerId]);
When the attacker authenticates with sub = victím-login, MySQL matches the existing row for oidc_subject = victim-login and returns the victim's user_id.
part2 — The returned user ID becomes the authenticated session
After provisioning returns the matched user_id, Poweradmin fetches the database username for that user and stores the matched user ID in the session:
// lib/Application/Service/OidcService.php:307-317
$databaseUsername = $this->userProvisioningService->getDatabaseUsername($userId);
$this->setSessionValue('userlogin', $databaseUsername);
// lib/Application/Service/OidcService.php:360-371
$this->setSessionValue('userid', $userId);
...
$this->setSessionValue('authenticated', true);
The attacker's OIDC password is validated by the IdP, but the local user_id selected by Poweradmin comes from the weak-collation SQL lookup.
Security Impact
An attacker who can register or control an OIDC principal with an accent/collation variant of a victim's OIDC subject can authenticate with the attacker's own IdP credentials and obtain a Poweradmin session for the victim's local account.
The confirmed PoC used distinct OIDC usernames, subjects, emails, and passwords. The attacker did not know or modify the victim's password.
Reproduction
1. Start the local Poweradmin OIDC lab
sudo -n docker compose -p poweradminoidcpoc -f poc/work/poweradmin-oidc-collation/docker-compose.yml up -d
The lab uses MySQL utf8mb4_unicode_ci and a local OIDC provider with two real login accounts:
Victim:
username/sub: victim-login
email: [email protected]
password: VictimPassword123!
Attacker:
username/sub: victím-login
email: [email protected]
password: AttackerPassword123!
2. Log in once as the victim through OIDC
Authenticate through GET /oidc/login?provider=generic using:
username: victim-login
password: VictimPassword123!
Poweradmin creates the victim local user and OIDC link:
users:
id username fullname email
2 victim-login Victim Poweradmin [email protected]
oidc_user_links:
id user_id provider_id oidc_subject
1 2 generic victim-login
3. Log in as the attacker OIDC user
Authenticate from a separate browser session with:
username: victím-login
password: AttackerPassword123!
Observed result from poc/work/poweradmin-oidc-collation/run_poc.py:
{
"attacker_login": {
"selected_idp_user": "attacker",
"selected_idp_username": "victím-login",
"has_session_cookie": true,
"home_contains_victim_username": true,
"home_contains_attacker_username": false
},
"attacker_resolved_to_victim": true
}
Database evidence after both logins:
version charset_server collation_server
8.4.10 utf8mb4 utf8mb4_unicode_ci
accent_collision
1
users:
id username fullname email
2 victim-login Victim Poweradmin [email protected]
oidc_user_links:
id user_id provider_id oidc_subject oidc_subject_hex
1 2 generic victim-login 76696374696D2D6C6F67696E
The application audit log also records all OIDC login events as the victim user:
user:victim-login operation:login_success auth_method:oidcHigh Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
4.1.0, fixed 4.2.5 (ecosystem)4.2.5
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4.3.0, fixed 4.3.4 (ecosystem)4.3.4
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0