Advisory

GHSA-cmwv-wf9p-p8wx

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Observed output:

initialize_status 200
session_created True
initialized_notification_status 202
tools_list_status 200

tools/list returns 12 tools, including:

connection_request
delete_task
download_firmware
get_parameter
manage_preset
manage_provision
reboot_device
refresh_parameter
retry_task
search_devices
set_parameter
tag_device

The get_parameter tool call reaches the fake GenieACS NBI and returns the planted marker:

Cached parameter values: [
  {
    "_id": "00236A-FAKE-CPE-PWNED",
    "_tags": [
      "poc-owned"
    ],
    "Device": {
      "DeviceInfo": {
        "SoftwareVersion": {
          "_value": "PLANTED-FAKE-FIRMWARE-9.9.9"
        },
        "SerialNumber": {
          "_value": "PLUTO-FAKE-CPE-0001"
        }
      },
      "ManagementServer": {
        "URL": {
          "_value": "https://acs-control.example.invalid/cwmp"
        }
      }
    }
  }
]

The fake GenieACS NBI also records the backend request from the MCP server:

FAKE_ACS_GET /devices/?projection=Device.DeviceInfo.SoftwareVersion%2CDevice.ManagementServer.URL&query=%7B%22_id%22%3A%2200236A-FAKE-CPE-PWNED%22%7D

Impact

A malicious website can control a victim's local genieacs-mcp HTTP server when the victim runs the documented default loopback HTTP mode. The page can initialize MCP, list available tools, and invoke GenieACS operations through the server's configured ACS_URL.

In a real deployment, this can expose or modify CPE management state through GenieACS. The exposed tools include device reboot, firmware download task creation, TR-069 parameter changes, preset and provision management, tag changes, connection requests, task deletion, and task retry. Those actions execute with the MCP server's configured GenieACS access.

Why this is a vulnerability, not intended behavior

  • The project treats loopback HTTP as a safety boundary. The README documents 127.0.0.1:8080 as the default HTTP listen address and requires MCP_AUTH_TOKEN only for non-loopback listeners.
  • DNS rebinding bypasses the loopback-only assumption unless the local HTTP server validates Host and Origin.
  • PR #22 added bearer authentication for non-loopback listeners. It explicitly left loopback listeners unauthenticated for compatibility. That protects direct non-loopback exposure, but it does not protect the browser-origin path into a loopback listener.
  • A local trusted MCP client is the intended caller. A public web page is not.

Remediation

Add Host and Origin validation before the MCP handler accepts any request. For the default loopback mode, allow only local values such as:

Host: 127.0.0.1:8080
Host: localhost:8080
Origin: http://127.0.0.1:8080
Origin: http://localhost:8080

Reject unexpected Host or Origin values before MCP initialization. Treat absent or non-local Origin on browser-reachable requests as suspicious unless the request is authenticated.

Also require a bearer token for HTTP transport even on loopback, or make stdio the default transport and require an explicit opt-in for unauthenticated loopback HTTP.

Sources & licences