Details
Observed output:
initialize_status 200
session_created True
initialized_notification_status 202
tools_list_status 200
tools/list returns 12 tools, including:
connection_request
delete_task
download_firmware
get_parameter
manage_preset
manage_provision
reboot_device
refresh_parameter
retry_task
search_devices
set_parameter
tag_device
The get_parameter tool call reaches the fake GenieACS NBI and returns the planted marker:
Cached parameter values: [
{
"_id": "00236A-FAKE-CPE-PWNED",
"_tags": [
"poc-owned"
],
"Device": {
"DeviceInfo": {
"SoftwareVersion": {
"_value": "PLANTED-FAKE-FIRMWARE-9.9.9"
},
"SerialNumber": {
"_value": "PLUTO-FAKE-CPE-0001"
}
},
"ManagementServer": {
"URL": {
"_value": "https://acs-control.example.invalid/cwmp"
}
}
}
}
]
The fake GenieACS NBI also records the backend request from the MCP server:
FAKE_ACS_GET /devices/?projection=Device.DeviceInfo.SoftwareVersion%2CDevice.ManagementServer.URL&query=%7B%22_id%22%3A%2200236A-FAKE-CPE-PWNED%22%7D
Impact
A malicious website can control a victim's local genieacs-mcp HTTP server when the victim runs the documented default loopback HTTP mode. The page can initialize MCP, list available tools, and invoke GenieACS operations through the server's configured ACS_URL.
In a real deployment, this can expose or modify CPE management state through GenieACS. The exposed tools include device reboot, firmware download task creation, TR-069 parameter changes, preset and provision management, tag changes, connection requests, task deletion, and task retry. Those actions execute with the MCP server's configured GenieACS access.
Why this is a vulnerability, not intended behavior
- The project treats loopback HTTP as a safety boundary. The README documents
127.0.0.1:8080as the default HTTP listen address and requiresMCP_AUTH_TOKENonly for non-loopback listeners. - DNS rebinding bypasses the loopback-only assumption unless the local HTTP server validates
HostandOrigin. - PR #22 added bearer authentication for non-loopback listeners. It explicitly left loopback listeners unauthenticated for compatibility. That protects direct non-loopback exposure, but it does not protect the browser-origin path into a loopback listener.
- A local trusted MCP client is the intended caller. A public web page is not.
Remediation
Add Host and Origin validation before the MCP handler accepts any request. For the default loopback mode, allow only local values such as:
Host: 127.0.0.1:8080
Host: localhost:8080
Origin: http://127.0.0.1:8080
Origin: http://localhost:8080
Reject unexpected Host or Origin values before MCP initialization. Treat absent or non-local Origin on browser-reachable requests as suspicious unless the request is authenticated.
Also require a bearer token for HTTP transport even on loopback, or make stdio the default transport and require an explicit opt-in for unauthenticated loopback HTTP.