Advisory

GHSA-crv5-9vww-q3g8

Also known as: CVE-2026-41239

Summary

DOMPurify has a SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES bypass in RETURN_DOM mode

Details

Summary

| Field | Value |
|:------|:------|
| Severity | Medium |
| Affected | DOMPurify main at `883ac15`, introduced in v1.0.10 (`7fc196db`) |

SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES strips {{...}} expressions from untrusted HTML. This works in string mode but not with RETURN_DOM or RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT, allowing XSS via template-evaluating frameworks like Vue 2.

Technical Details

DOMPurify strips template expressions in two passes:

  1. Per-node — each text node is checked during the tree walk (`purify.ts:1179-1191`):
// pass #1: runs on every text node during tree walk
if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES && currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.text) {
  content = currentNode.textContent;
  content = content.replace(MUSTACHE_EXPR, ' ');  // {{...}} -> ' '
  content = content.replace(ERB_EXPR, ' ');        // <%...%> -> ' '
  content = content.replace(TMPLIT_EXPR, ' ');      // ${...  -> ' '
  currentNode.textContent = content;
}
  1. Final string scrub — after serialization, the full HTML string is scrubbed again (`purify.ts:1679-1683`). This is the safety net that catches expressions that only form after the DOM settles.

The RETURN_DOM path returns before pass #2 ever runs (`purify.ts:1637-1661`):

// purify.ts (simplified)

if (RETURN_DOM) {
  // ... build returnNode ...
  return returnNode;        // <-- exits here, pass #2 never runs
}

// pass #2: only reached by string-mode callers
if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
  serializedHTML = serializedHTML.replace(MUSTACHE_EXPR, ' ');
}
return serializedHTML;

The payload {<foo></foo>{constructor.constructor('alert(1)')()}<foo></foo>} exploits this:

  1. Parser creates: TEXT("{") → <foo> → TEXT("{payload}") → <foo> → TEXT("}") — no single node contains {{, so pass #1 misses it
  2. <foo> is not allowed, so DOMPurify removes it but keeps surrounding text
  3. The three text nodes are now adjacent — .outerHTML reads them as {{payload}}, which Vue 2 compiles and executes

Reproduce

Open the following html in any browser and alert(1) pops up.

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>

<body>
  <script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/[email protected]/dist/purify.min.js"></script>
  <script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/[email protected]/dist/vue.min.js"></script>
  <script>
    var dirty = '<div id="app">{<foo></foo>{constructor.constructor("alert(1)")()}<foo></foo>}</div>';
    var dom = DOMPurify.sanitize(dirty, { SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true, RETURN_DOM: true });
    document.body.appendChild(dom.firstChild);
    new Vue({ el: '#app' });
  </script>
</body>

</html>

Impact

Any application that sanitizes attacker-controlled HTML with SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true and RETURN_DOM: true (or RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT: true), then mounts the result into a template-evaluating framework, is vulnerable to XSS.

Recommendations

Fix

normalize() merges the split text nodes, then the same regex from the string path catches the expression. Placed before the fragment logic, this fixes both RETURN_DOM and RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT.

     if (RETURN_DOM) {
+      if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
+        body.normalize();
+        let html = body.innerHTML;
+        arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR, ERB_EXPR, TMPLIT_EXPR], (expr: RegExp) => {
+          html = stringReplace(html, expr, ' ');
+        });
+        body.innerHTML = html;
+      }
+
       if (RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {
         returnNode = createDocumentFragment.call(body.ownerDocument);

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-04-22 17:32 UTC
Modified
2026-09-10 03:50 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

dompurify

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 1.0.10, fixed 3.4.0 (semver)

Fixed versions

3.4.0

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences