hono
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed4.13.5(semver)
Fixed versions
4.13.5
Fix
- Fixed version
4.13.5npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-84363
Hono: Query parser reads parameters after the URL fragment, causing cache-key and proxy interpretation differentials
Summary
Hono's query parsing does not stop at the URL fragment: a ? appearing after a # is treated as the start of a query string. As a result, the application can read request parameters that no other component involved in handling the request can see.
Details
A fragment is never part of the query, and every standard URL consumer — browsers, new URL(), reverse proxies — ignores everything from the first # onward. Hono's routing followed that rule; its query helpers did not.
For one and the same request, this produces an interpretation differential:
The same divergence reaches request validation and any middleware that reads query parameters.
This requires a request target containing a literal # to reach the application. Deployments on runtimes that normalise such a target — including Cloudflare Workers — are not affected, and neither are those behind an intermediary that strips the fragment.
Impact
An attacker can cause the application to act on parameters that components in front of it never observe.
This may lead to:
This issue affects applications that read query parameters and run on a runtime that passes a literal # through to the request URL.
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 4.13.5 (semver)4.13.5
4.13.5npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0