gogs.io/gogs
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.14.0(semver)
Fixed versions
0.14.0
Fix
- Fixed version
0.14.0go get gogs.io/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-25229, GO-2026-4499
Gogs has an Authorization Bypass Allows Cross-Repository Label Modification in Gogs
Summary
A broken access control vulnerability in Gogs allows authenticated users with write access to any repository to modify labels belonging to other repositories. The UpdateLabel function in the Web UI (internal/route/repo/issue.go) fails to verify that the label being modified belongs to the repository specified in the URL path, enabling cross-repository label tampering attacks.
Details
The vulnerability exists in the Web UI's label update endpoint POST /:username/:reponame/labels/edit. The handler function UpdateLabel uses an incorrect database query function that bypasses repository ownership validation:
Vulnerable Code (internal/route/repo/issue.go:1040-1054):
func UpdateLabel(c *context.Context, f form.CreateLabel) {
l, err := database.GetLabelByID(f.ID) // ❌ No repository validation
if err != nil {
c.NotFoundOrError(err, "get label by ID")
return
}
// ❌ Missing validation: l.RepoID != c.Repo.Repository.ID
l.Name = f.Title
l.Color = f.Color
if err := database.UpdateLabel(l); err != nil {
c.Error(err, "update label")
return
}
c.RawRedirect(c.Repo.MakeURL("labels"))
}
Root Cause:
database.GetLabelByID(f.ID) which internally passes repoID=0 to the ORM layerinternal/database/issue_label.go:147-166, passing repoID=0 causes the ORM to ignore repository restrictionsl.RepoID == c.Repo.Repository.ID before updatingreqRepoWriter() only validates write access to the repository in the URL path, not the label's actual repositoryInconsistency with Other Functions:
NewLabel: Correctly sets RepoID = c.Repo.Repository.IDDeleteLabel: Correctly uses database.DeleteLabel(c.Repo.Repository.ID, id)EditLabel: Correctly uses database.GetLabelOfRepoByID(c.Repo.Repository.ID, id)PoC
Prerequisites:
Step 1: Identify Target Label ID
Step 2: Execute Attack
# Login as alice, get session cookie
# Open DevTools → Application → Cookies → i_like_gogs
# Copy the cookie value
# Send malicious request
curl -X POST "http://localhost:3000/alice/repo-a/labels/edit" \
-H "Cookie: i_like_gogs=<ALICE_SESSION_COOKIE>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
-d "id=1&title=HACKED-BY-ALICE&color=%23000000"
# Expected response: 302 Found (redirect)
Step 3: Verify Impact
Impact
Recommended Fix:
func UpdateLabel(c *context.Context, f form.CreateLabel) {
l, err := database.GetLabelOfRepoByID(c.Repo.Repository.ID, f.ID)
if err != nil {
c.NotFoundOrError(err, "get label of repository by ID")
return
}
// Now label ownership is validated at database layer
l.Name = f.Title
l.Color = f.Color
if err := database.UpdateLabel(l); err != nil {
c.Error(err, "update label")
return
}
c.RawRedirect(c.Repo.MakeURL("labels"))
}Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 0.14.0 (semver)0.14.0
0.14.0go get gogs.io/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0