Advisory

GHSA-cv22-72px-f4gh

Also known as: CVE-2026-25229, GO-2026-4499

Summary

Gogs has an Authorization Bypass Allows Cross-Repository Label Modification in Gogs

Details

Summary
A broken access control vulnerability in Gogs allows authenticated users with write access to any repository to modify labels belonging to other repositories. The UpdateLabel function in the Web UI (internal/route/repo/issue.go) fails to verify that the label being modified belongs to the repository specified in the URL path, enabling cross-repository label tampering attacks.

Details
The vulnerability exists in the Web UI's label update endpoint POST /:username/:reponame/labels/edit. The handler function UpdateLabel uses an incorrect database query function that bypasses repository ownership validation:

Vulnerable Code (internal/route/repo/issue.go:1040-1054):

func UpdateLabel(c *context.Context, f form.CreateLabel) {
    l, err := database.GetLabelByID(f.ID)  // ❌ No repository validation
    if err != nil {
        c.NotFoundOrError(err, "get label by ID")
        return
    }

    // ❌ Missing validation: l.RepoID != c.Repo.Repository.ID
    l.Name = f.Title
    l.Color = f.Color
    if err := database.UpdateLabel(l); err != nil {
        c.Error(err, "update label")
        return
    }
    c.RawRedirect(c.Repo.MakeURL("labels"))
}

Root Cause:

  1. The function calls database.GetLabelByID(f.ID) which internally passes repoID=0 to the ORM layer
  2. According to code comments in internal/database/issue_label.go:147-166, passing repoID=0 causes the ORM to ignore repository restrictions
  3. No validation checks whether l.RepoID == c.Repo.Repository.ID before updating
  4. The middleware reqRepoWriter() only validates write access to the repository in the URL path, not the label's actual repository

Inconsistency with Other Functions:

  • NewLabel: Correctly sets RepoID = c.Repo.Repository.ID
  • DeleteLabel: Correctly uses database.DeleteLabel(c.Repo.Repository.ID, id)
  • API EditLabel: Correctly uses database.GetLabelOfRepoByID(c.Repo.Repository.ID, id)
  • **Only `UpdateLabel` in Web UI** uses the vulnerable pattern****

PoC
Prerequisites:

  • Two user accounts: Alice (attacker) and Bob (victim)
  • alice has written access to repo-a
  • Bob owns repo-b with labels

Step 1: Identify Target Label ID

  1. Login as bob, navigate to bob/repo-b/labels
  2. Open browser DevTools (F12) → Network tab
  3. Click edit on any label
  4. Observe the form data: id=<LABEL_ID>
  5. Example: id=1

Step 2: Execute Attack

# Login as alice, get session cookie
# Open DevTools → Application → Cookies → i_like_gogs
# Copy the cookie value

# Send malicious request
curl -X POST "http://localhost:3000/alice/repo-a/labels/edit" \
  -H "Cookie: i_like_gogs=<ALICE_SESSION_COOKIE>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
  -d "id=1&title=HACKED-BY-ALICE&color=%23000000"

# Expected response: 302 Found (redirect)

Step 3: Verify Impact

  1. Login as bob
  2. Navigate to bob/repo-b/labels
  3. Observe: Label "P0-Critical" is now "HACKED-BY-ALICE" with black color

Impact

  1. Issue Classification Disruption: Modify critical labels (e.g., "P0-Critical" → "P3-Low") causing urgent issues to be deprioritized
  1. Security Issue Concealment: Change "security" labels to "documentation" to hide vulnerability reports from security teams
  1. Workflow** Sabotage**: Alter labels used in CI/CD automation, breaking deployment pipelines
  1. Mass Disruption: Batch modifies all labels across multiple repositories using ID enumeration

Recommended Fix:

func UpdateLabel(c *context.Context, f form.CreateLabel) {
    l, err := database.GetLabelOfRepoByID(c.Repo.Repository.ID, f.ID)
    if err != nil {
        c.NotFoundOrError(err, "get label of repository by ID")
        return
    }
    // Now label ownership is validated at database layer
    l.Name = f.Title
    l.Color = f.Color
    if err := database.UpdateLabel(l); err != nil {
        c.Error(err, "update label")
        return
    }
    c.RawRedirect(c.Repo.MakeURL("labels"))
}

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-02-17 18:42 UTC
Modified
2026-02-23 19:26 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

gogs.io/gogs

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 0.14.0 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.14.0

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences