Advisory

GHSA-cw2g-2vwq-88w6

Also known as: CVE-2026-63478

Summary

isomorphic-git: Path traversal via a ".." tree-entry name writes files outside the working directory on clone/checkout

Details

Summary
isomorphic-git's tree parser (src/models/GitTree.js) validates each entry name only against the path separators / and \. It does not reject the standalone reserved name .., so a malicious repository can, on a single clone/checkout, **write files outside the working
directory** (unbounded depth). Works on any host-backed fs provider.

Details
The guard is:

// src/models/GitTree.js
if (path.includes('\\') || path.includes('/')) {
  throw new UnsafeFilepathError(path)
}

The standalone string .. passes. isomorphic-git assembles the full path incrementally across tree levels, so nesting .. trees yields ../escaped.txt, ../../escaped.txt, … with unbounded depth (each level is a separate tree object that passes the per-entry guard). On checkout mkdir(workdir/..) hits EEXIST (ignored) and the file is written above the working directory. Depth is chosen to reach the home dir, /etc, /tmp, etc.; overwriting a shell rc / config / startup file can escalate to code execution.

Canonical git behavior (divergence)
git rejects this via verify_path(): git read-tree fails with error: invalid path '../escaped.txt' and git fsck flags warning … hasDotdot: contains '..'. (git's verify_path also rejects . and .git, the latter flagged by fsck as hasDotgit — see the fix note below.) GitHub runs fsck on push, so such a tree can't be hosted there; reach is limited to a self-hosted/Smart-HTTP remote or a MitM.

PoC
https://github.com/spiceoverflow/av2-dotdot-traversal — open in a Codespace; a single git.clone() from the bundled server writes escaped.txt one directory above the clone target (DEPTH=N escapes N levels):

[AV-2] *** PATH TRAVERSAL CONFIRMED ***
[AV-2] File written outside workdir: …/escaped.txt

Impact
A path-traversal arbitrary file write outside the working directory (CWE-22), triggered by a single clone/checkout; it can escalate to code execution by overwriting shell rc, config, or startup files.

Any application or user that clones/checks out an untrusted (or compromised / MitM'd) repository with isomorphic-git on a host-backed filesystem (Linux, macOS, or Windows — no symlink or privilege required). Requires a non-GitHub remote (self-hosted / Smart-HTTP) or a MitM, since GitHub's fsck rejects trees containing ...

Suggested fix
In the tree parser, reject any entry name equal to . or ... For full verify_path parity it should also reject .git (case-insensitively, trailing dots/spaces stripped) and the NTFS 8.3 / HFS variants git blocks. Note: a literal .git entry is *not* independently exploitable via
clone/checkout in current isomorphic-git — the checkout walk skips a .git tree entry (a sibling file is written but the .git entry is not), so rejecting .git is defense-in-depth / git parity rather than a separately demonstrated bug. Additionally, normalize and bounds-check the assembled full path against the working-tree root before any filesystem write.

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-11-09 20:13 UTC
Modified
2026-11-09 20:30 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

isomorphic-git

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 1.38.6 (semver)

Fixed versions

1.38.6

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences