Advisory

GHSA-cw6x-mw64-q6pv

Also known as: CVE-2026-30959

Summary

OneUptime has WhatsApp Resend Verification Authorization Bypass

Details

Description
The resend-verification-code endpoint allows any authenticated user to trigger a verification code resend for any UserWhatsApp record by ID. Ownership is not validated (unlike the verify endpoint).

Affected Source

Full Code Lines (UserWhatsAppAPI.ts)

Resend path (authorization gap):

    this.router.post(
      `${new this.entityType()
        .getCrudApiPath()
        ?.toString()}/resend-verification-code`,
      UserMiddleware.getUserMiddleware,
      async (req: ExpressRequest, res: ExpressResponse, next: NextFunction) => {
        try {
          req = req as OneUptimeRequest;

          if (!req.body.itemId) {
            return Response.sendErrorResponse(
              req,
              res,
              new BadDataException("Invalid item ID"),
            );
          }

          await this.service.resendVerificationCode(req.body.itemId);

          return Response.sendEmptySuccessResponse(req, res);
        } catch (err) {
          return next(err);
        }
      },
    );

Verify path (ownership check present):

          if (
            item.userId?.toString() !==
            (req as OneUptimeRequest)?.userAuthorization?.userId?.toString()
          ) {
            return Response.sendErrorResponse(
              req,
              res,
              new BadDataException("Invalid user ID"),
            );
          }

Prerequisites

  • Valid attacker account with access to a project
  • Attacker access token
  • A victim’s UserWhatsApp itemId belonging to the same project

Steps to Reproduce

  1. Set your attacker token:
   export ATK="Bearer <attacker-access-token>"
  1. Trigger resend for the victim’s item:
   curl -s -X POST \
     -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
     -H "Authorization: $ATK" \
     -d '{"itemId":"<victim-userwhatsapp-id>"}' \
     http://<host>/api/user-whats-app/resend-verification-code

Expected/Observed Behavior

  • HTTP 200 with {} body and a new verification code sent to the victim’s phone
  • No checks confirm that item.userId equals the authenticated user’s ID for the resend path

Impact

  • Spam/DoS against victims’ phone numbers, social engineering pressure, and potential lockout flows due to repeated resends

Recommended Fix

  • Enforce ownership: item.userId must match the authenticated user
  • Add per-item and per-user rate limiting for resends

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-03-10 01:15 UTC
Modified
2026-03-10 19:01 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

@oneuptime/common

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 10.0.21 (semver)

Fixed versions

10.0.21

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

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View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences