zebrad
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed4.4.0(semver)
Fixed versions
4.4.0
Fix
- Fixed version
4.4.0cargo update -p zebrad --precise 4.4.0
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-104437
Zebra's Transparent SIGHASH_SINGLE Handling Diverges from zcashd for Corresponding Outputs
Zebra Transparent SIGHASH_SINGLE Corresponding-Output Handling Diverges From zcashd
Summary
For V5+ transparent spends, Zebra and zcashd disagree on the same consensus rule: SIGHASH_SINGLE must fail when the input index has no corresponding output. zcashd treats this as consensus-invalid under ZIP-244, while Zebra's transparent verification path computes a digest for the missing-output case instead of failing.
The result is a direct block-validity split. A malformed V5 transparent transaction can be accepted by Zebra, retained in Zebra's mempool, selected into Zebra getblocktemplate, mined into a block, and then rejected by zcashd.
Details
Validated code revisions used during analysis:
zcashd: 2c63e9aa08cb170b0feb374161bea94720c3e1f5Zebra: a905fa19e3a91c7b4ead331e2709e6dec5db12cbScope note:
zcashd side:
TransactionSignatureChecker::CheckSig() and SignatureHash(): `zcash/src/script/interpreter.cpp`.SignatureHash() explicitly throws when SIGHASH_SINGLE or SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY is used with nIn >= txTo.vout.size(): `zcash/src/script/interpreter.cpp`.CheckSig() catches that exception and returns false, causing the transparent script to fail.Zebra side:
Zebra converts the decoded hash type and asks its Rust sighash engine for a digest without adding the corresponding-output pre-check that zcashd enforces first: `zebra/zebra-script/src/lib.rs`, `zebra/zebra-chain/src/primitives/zcash_primitives.rs`.Zebra forwards canonical SIGHASH_SINGLE into the Rust ZIP-244 implementation.input.index() >= bundle.vout.len(), the code uses transparent_outputs_hash::<TxOut>(&[]) instead of erroring: `zcash_primitives/src/transaction/sighash_v5.rs`, `zcash_primitives/src/transaction/sighash_v5.rs`.Why this is exploitable:
Zebra computes for the missing-output case;Zebra then sees a valid transparent signature, while zcashd never reaches the same digest because it fails first.Ordinary path viability:
zcashd ordinary mempool admission is not the practical trigger path, because the same ZIP-244 SignatureHash() checks fail there first: `zcash/src/main.cpp`, `zcash/src/script/interpreter.cpp`.Zebra ordinary mempool admission is viable because Zebra uses the same transparent verifier for mempool and block validation and does not have a separate "one output per input" standardness rule here: `zebra/zebra-consensus/src/transaction.rs`, `zebra/zebrad/src/components/mempool/storage.rs`.Zebra is a block-template producer, so the realistic stock path is Zebra mempool -> Zebra getblocktemplate -> external miner: `zebra/zebra-rpc/src/methods/types/get_block_template/zip317.rs`.PoC
Validated commits:
zcashd: 2c63e9aa08cb170b0feb374161bea94720c3e1f5Zebra: a905fa19e3a91c7b4ead331e2709e6dec5db12cbManual reproduction steps:
0 normally.1 with canonical SIGHASH_SINGLE or SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY.Zebra's ZIP-244 path, where the missing output contributes transparent_outputs_hash([]).Zebra and to zcashd.Zebra accepts it into the mempool;Zebra selects it into getblocktemplate;Zebra can mine and accept a block containing it;zcashd rejects it in the ordinary mempool path.Impact
This is a direct V5+ transparent consensus split.
Who can trigger it:
Zebra's mempool and block-template path;Who is impacted:
Zebra can accept and template a transaction / block that zcashd rejects;Zebra block-template safety problem.Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, fixed 4.4.0 (semver)4.4.0
4.4.0cargo update -p zebrad --precise 4.4.0Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0