Advisory

GHSA-cwfq-rfcr-8hmp

Also known as: CVE-2026-104437

Summary

Zebra's Transparent SIGHASH_SINGLE Handling Diverges from zcashd for Corresponding Outputs

Details

Zebra Transparent SIGHASH_SINGLE Corresponding-Output Handling Diverges From zcashd

Summary
For V5+ transparent spends, Zebra and zcashd disagree on the same consensus rule: SIGHASH_SINGLE must fail when the input index has no corresponding output. zcashd treats this as consensus-invalid under ZIP-244, while Zebra's transparent verification path computes a digest for the missing-output case instead of failing.

The result is a direct block-validity split. A malformed V5 transparent transaction can be accepted by Zebra, retained in Zebra's mempool, selected into Zebra getblocktemplate, mined into a block, and then rejected by zcashd.

Details
Validated code revisions used during analysis:

  • zcashd: 2c63e9aa08cb170b0feb374161bea94720c3e1f5
  • Zebra: a905fa19e3a91c7b4ead331e2709e6dec5db12cb

Scope note:

  • earlier triage material grouped pre-V5 and V5 behavior together;
  • re-execution on the pinned revisions did not reproduce the claimed pre-V5 / V4 reject-side behavior;
  • this advisory therefore covers the V5+ / ZIP-244 variant only.

zcashd side:

  • Transparent scripts in blocks are checked through TransactionSignatureChecker::CheckSig() and SignatureHash(): `zcash/src/script/interpreter.cpp`.
  • In the ZIP-244 branch, SignatureHash() explicitly throws when SIGHASH_SINGLE or SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY is used with nIn >= txTo.vout.size(): `zcash/src/script/interpreter.cpp`.
  • CheckSig() catches that exception and returns false, causing the transparent script to fail.

Zebra side:

Why this is exploitable:

  • the malformed transaction only needs fewer transparent outputs than inputs;
  • the attacker signs the digest that Zebra computes for the missing-output case;
  • Zebra then sees a valid transparent signature, while zcashd never reaches the same digest because it fails first.

Ordinary path viability:

PoC
Validated commits:

  • zcashd: 2c63e9aa08cb170b0feb374161bea94720c3e1f5
  • Zebra: a905fa19e3a91c7b4ead331e2709e6dec5db12cb

Manual reproduction steps:

  1. Build an otherwise-valid V5 transaction with at least two transparent inputs and only one transparent output.
  2. Sign input 0 normally.
  3. Sign input 1 with canonical SIGHASH_SINGLE or SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY.
  4. Use the digest returned by Zebra's ZIP-244 path, where the missing output contributes transparent_outputs_hash([]).
  5. Submit the transaction to Zebra and to zcashd.
  6. Observe:
  • Zebra accepts it into the mempool;
  • Zebra selects it into getblocktemplate;
  • Zebra can mine and accept a block containing it;
  • zcashd rejects it in the ordinary mempool path.

Impact
This is a direct V5+ transparent consensus split.

Who can trigger it:

  • an ordinary transaction author can craft the malformed V5 transparent transaction;
  • the accept-side stock path is Zebra's mempool and block-template path;
  • an external miner still has to include the transaction in a block for the split to materialize.

Who is impacted:

  • Zebra can accept and template a transaction / block that zcashd rejects;
  • this makes the issue both a consensus-divergence problem and a practical Zebra block-template safety problem.

Severity

Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL

Dates

Published
2026-05-07 21:02 UTC
Modified
2026-10-03 03:56 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

zebrad

crates.io · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 4.4.0 (semver)

Fixed versions

4.4.0

Fix

  • Fixed version 4.4.0
    cargo update -p zebrad --precise 4.4.0

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences