Details
Final state:
--- .gitmodules:
[submodule "sub"]
path = sub
url = /tmp/sub-origin
update = !touch /tmp/pwned
--- .git/config (submodule section):
[submodule "sub"]
active = true
url = /tmp/sub-origin
Upstream git on this state:
$ cd /tmp/victim && git submodule update
fatal: invalid value for 'submodule.sub.update'
$ echo $?
128
$ test -f /tmp/pwned && echo VULNERABLE || echo SAFE
SAFE
Gitoxide on the same state:
// /tmp/gix-repro/main.rs
let repo = gix::open("/tmp/victim")?;
for sm in repo.submodules()?.expect("submodules present") {
println!("{}: {:?}", sm.name(), sm.update());
}
$ cargo run
sub: Ok(Some(Command("touch /tmp/pwned")))
The CommandForbiddenInModulesConfiguration guard never fires.
Impact
Direct
Any downstream code built on gix that:
- Calls
Submodule::update()to determine the update strategy, and - Trusts that
Update::Command(_)is safe to execute (becauseCommandForbiddenInModulesConfigurationexists as the documented guard)
…will execute attacker-controlled shell commands on submodule update against a previously-initialized submodule.
gix itself does not currently ship a submodule update implementation, so there is no RCE in the gix CLI today. However:
- The
Submodule::update()API is public atgix/src/submodule/mod.rs:108and delegates directly to the vulnerable function. - The error variant name (
CommandForbiddenInModulesConfiguration) and test suite (valid_in_overridesatgix-submodule/tests/file/mod.rs:272) explicitly document this as the security boundary. - Any third-party tool, IDE plugin, or CI integration building submodule-update on top of
gixinherits this vulnerability.
Indirect / second-order
- CI/forge integrations that auto-init submodules and then query the update mode
- Editor/IDE extensions using
gixfor submodule info - Gitoxide-based
initequivalents - any tool that implements its own init (writingurlto local config) creates the bypass state without needing the pull-after-init sequence