Advisory

GHSA-f3g8-9xv5-77gv

Also known as: CVE-2026-42259

Summary

Saltcorn: Open Redirect in POST /auth/login due to incomplete is_relative_url validation (backslash bypass)

Details

Summary
Saltcorn validates the post-login dest parameter with a string check that only blocks :/ and //. Because all WHATWG-compliant browsers normalise backslashes (\) to forward slashes (/) for special schemes, a payload such as /\evil.com/path slips through is_relative_url(), is emitted unchanged in the HTTP Location header, and causes the browser to navigate cross-origin to an attacker-controlled domain. The bug is reachable on a default install and only requires a victim who can be tricked into logging in via a crafted Saltcorn URL.

Details
Vulnerable function: packages/server/routes/utils.js:393-395

const is_relative_url = (url) => {
  return typeof url === "string" && !url.includes(":/") && !url.includes("//");
};

The function's intent is to allow only same-origin redirects, but the allow-list only checks for two literal substrings. It does not handle:

  • backslash characters, which WHATWG URL parsing (used by every modern browser) treats as forward slashes for the special schemes http, https, ftp, ws, wss. A URL parser fed /\evil.com/path with a base of http://victim/ resolves to http://evil.com/path.
  • non-http(s): schemes that do not contain :/. The strings javascript:alert(1), data:text/html,..., vbscript:... all pass.

Vulnerable callsite: packages/server/auth/routes.js:1371-1376

} else if (
  (req.body || {}).dest &&
  is_relative_url(decodeURIComponent((req.body || {}).dest))
) {
  res.redirect(decodeURIComponent((req.body || {}).dest));
} else res.redirect("/");

The body's dest is URL-decoded twice (once by body-parser, once by the explicit decodeURIComponent) and the same value is passed to res.redirect. Express 5's res.redirect runs the value through [email protected], whose whitelist character class [^\x21\x23-\x3B\x3D\x3F-\x5F\x61-\x7A\x7C\x7E] includes \x5C (backslash). The backslash is therefore not percent-encoded and ends up verbatim in the Location response header.

PoC
poc.zip

Please extract the uploaded compressed file before proceeding

  1. ./setup.sh
  2. ./poc.sh

<img width="419" height="71" alt="스크린샷 2026-04-13 오후 11 44 36" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/9c919ed4-167b-47e3-9873-733f97b44bf0" />

Impact
Any user who can be lured into clicking a Saltcorn login URL crafted by the attacker will, after submitting their valid credentials, be redirected to an attacker-controlled origin. The redirect happens under the trusted Saltcorn domain, so the user has no visual cue that they are about to leave the site. Realistic abuse patterns:

  • Credential phishing — the attacker's site renders a forged "session expired, please log in again" prompt to capture the password the user just typed.

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-04-16 23:00 UTC
Modified
2026-05-11 13:53 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

@saltcorn/server

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 1.4.6 (semver)

Fixed versions

1.4.6

Fix

@saltcorn/server

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 1.5.0-beta.0, fixed 1.5.6 (semver)

Fixed versions

1.5.6

Fix

@saltcorn/server

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 1.6.0-alpha.0, fixed 1.6.0-beta.5 (semver)

Fixed versions

1.6.0-beta.5

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

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Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences