Advisory

GHSA-f5gc-qxf8-mh9g

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

The marker file is created by the injected command sequence, not by the WeasyPrint binary; the WeasyPrint call inside the same shell line fails afterwards (no PDF produced), but the injected payload has already executed.

Negative control on a benign binary path:

php poc_negctrl.php
# --- buildCommand for benign binary ---
# /usr/local/bin/weasyprint '/dev/null' '/tmp/poc_out_neg.pdf'
# Benign-path negative control clean: no spurious marker.

Even the benign path is emitted raw (without single-quotes around the binary), confirming the is_executable() guard never returns true — defensive depth is gone for every deployment, not just the malicious one.

Fix verification: replacing both buildCommand overrides with the KnpLabs/snappy 1.7.1 shape (if (!\is_executable($binary)) throw new RuntimeException(...); $command = \escapeshellarg($binary);) and re-running the same harness:

--- patched buildCommand output ---
[OK] buildCommand rejected malicious binary at the guard. msg: The binary 'weasyprint --version > /dev/null; touch /tmp/php_weasyprint_rce_marker_patched; #' is not executable.
generate() threw (expected, the corrected guard rejects the malicious $binary): RuntimeException: The binary 'weasyprint ...' is not executable.
PATCH OK — marker absent, injection blocked.

The corrected guard runs is_executable() on the unescaped $binary. For the attacker payload that lookup returns false (no file by that name exists on disk), the exception fires before Process::fromShellCommandline is ever called, and the marker file is never created.

Impact

  • Shell-command injection as the PHP-FPM / CLI user whenever the WeasyPrint binary path is influenced by configuration, environment, or per-tenant settings.
  • Affects every consumer that does not hard-code a constant binary path baked into the deployed code. Empirically, both the project's own README and tests demonstrate the binary path as a configurable constructor argument (new Pdf('/usr/local/bin/weasyprint')), and downstream framework integrations (Symfony / Laravel) typically wire it through container config.
  • Defensive-in-depth regression even for hard-coded paths: a reader of buildCommand reasonably expects the binary to be shell-escaped because the code visually claims to do so. Any later change that reads the binary from a less-trusted source inherits the dead guard.

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H (7.6, High) — adjust to AV:N when the binary path is reachable from an unauthenticated request surface (e.g. an admin endpoint without proper auth).

Suggested fix

Mirror the KnpLabs/snappy 1.7.1 fix shape exactly (the upstream library this project explicitly mirrors):

--- a/src/AbstractGenerator.php
+++ b/src/AbstractGenerator.php
@@
     protected function buildCommand(string $binary, string $input, string $output, array $options = []): string
     {
-        $escapedBinary = \escapeshellarg($binary);
-        $command = \is_executable($escapedBinary) ? $escapedBinary : $binary;
+        if (!\is_executable($binary)) {
+            throw new \RuntimeException(sprintf("The binary '%s' is not executable.", $binary));
+        }
+        $command = \escapeshellarg($binary);

Apply the identical change to src/Pdf.php::buildCommand. The is_executable() check now runs against the raw $binary (the only string that can name a real file on disk), and the escapeshellarg() call only quotes a string that has already been verified as a real executable path on the local filesystem.

A regression test that asserts buildCommand throws on a $binary string containing ; / && / | should be added so the dead-guard pattern cannot reappear silently.

Credit

Reported by tonghuaroot.

Sources & licences