Details
PoC fired locally — non-destructive marker write, mirrors the validateCommand → executeSecureCommand chain in Python (Go subprocess semantics for exec.CommandContext are equivalent to Python subprocess.run for arg-array dispatch):
=== Class 1: Security default-off (config.go:49 Enabled=false) ===
[CONFIG] Security.Enabled = False
[VALIDATE] error = None (None = allowed)
[STDOUT] uid=1000(...) gid=1000(...) groups=1000(...),...
EXEC_CONFIRMED
=== Class 2: Shell interpreter in allowed_executables allowlist ===
[PARSE] executable='/bin/bash', args=['-c', "'id; echo BASH_ALLOWLIST_BYPASS'"]
[CHECK] /bin/bash in allowed_executables: True
Source-line citations at commit 17ac0eef5c9a5a42b8fb132d3d034973d55a5433:
config.go:49—Enabled: falsedefaultsecurity.go:26-28—if !v.config.Enabled { return nil }short-circuitmain.go:35-39— env-var conditional that ships disabled when unsetexecutor.go:142-163—parseCommand()+exec.CommandContext(ctx, executable, args...)dispatch path
The cmd-unfurl/expansion approach you raised is more interesting on the technical merits — it would close the bash-allowlist case directly (unfurl /bin/bash -c '<inner>' to expose the inner command for blocklist evaluation). It still wouldn't close the default-off case, because unfurl only runs when validation runs, and validation short-circuits when Enabled=false.
The minimal-change fix on both fronts remains: flip Enabled to true by default, drop shell interpreters from the example allowlist. Sandbox recommendation is reasonable as defense-in-depth but doesn't substitute for closing the two install-path defaults.