Advisory

GHSA-f5x6-7qgp-jhf3

Also known as: CVE-2023-37902, PYSEC-2023-133

Summary

ecrecover can return undefined data if signature does not verify

Details

Impact
the ecrecover precompile does not fill the output buffer if the signature does not verify, see https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/blob/b058cf454b3bdc7e770e2b3cec83a0bcb48f55ee/core/vm/contracts.go#L188. however, the ecrecover builtin will still return whatever is at memory location 0.

this means that the if the compiler has been convinced to write to the 0 memory location with specially crafted data (generally, this can happen with a hashmap access or immutable read) just before the ecrecover, a signature check might pass on an invalid signature.

A contract search was performed. Most uses of ecrecover are used for erc2612-style permit implementations, which typically look like:

    assert _owner != empty(address)
    assert block.timestamp <= _deadline
                  
    nonce: uint256 = self.nonces[_owner]
    digest: bytes32 = keccak256(
        concat(   
            b"\x19\x01",
            self.DOMAIN_SEPARATOR,
            keccak256(_abi_encode(PERMIT_TYPEHASH, _owner, _spender, _value, nonce, _deadline))
        )         
    )             
    assert ecrecover(digest, convert(_v, uint256), convert(_r, uint256), convert(_s, uint256)) == _owner

in this case, the immutable PERMIT_TYPEHASH is loaded into ecrecover's output buffer right before ecrecover(), and so the output of ecrecover() here when the signature is invalid will be the value of PERMIT_TYPEHASH. in this case, since PERMIT_TYPEHASH is not a valid address, it will never compare == to _owner, and so the behaviour is exactly the same as if ecrecover() returned 0 in this case.

in general, a contract could have unexpected behavior (i.e. mistakenly pass this style of signature check) if an immutable representing a real address (ex. OWNER) was read right before the ecrecover operation.

Patches
v0.3.10 (with 019a37ab98ff53f04fecfadf602b6cd5ac748f7f and #3586)

Workarounds
_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_

References
_Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2023-07-25 17:46 UTC
Modified
2024-11-19 17:01 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

vyper

PyPI · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 0.3.10 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

0.3.10

Fix

  • Fixed version 0.3.10
    pip install --upgrade vyper==0.3.10

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

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Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences