snipe/snipe-it
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed8.6.1(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
8.6.1
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-55462
Snipe-IT has an authorization bypass on print inventory page
Impact
An authenticated user with only users.view can open another user's detail page and see assigned license, accessory, and consumable data even though the same account is denied direct access to the Licenses, Accessories, and Consumables modules. The leaked data includes software license names, purchase order/order values, accessory and consumable names, assignment notes, and purchase costs.
Attacker Model
Authenticated user with only:
{"users.view":"1"}
The attacker does not have:
{
"licenses.view": "1",
"accessories.view": "1",
"consumables.view": "1",
"assets.view": "1"
}
Affected Component
app/Http/Controllers/Users/UsersController.phpresources/views/users/view.blade.phpresources/views/users/print.blade.php - GET /users/{user}
- GET /users/{user}/print
Root Cause
UsersController::show() authorizes only viewing the user, then loads inventory relationships:
$this->authorize('view', $user);
$user = User::with([
'consumables',
'accessories',
'licenses',
'userloc',
'groups',
])
resources/views/users/view.blade.php renders those relationships without checking the corresponding module permissions. The license table renders name, purchase cost, purchase order, and order number. The accessory and consumable tables render item names, notes, and unit costs.
UsersController::printInventory() similarly authorizes only view on User::class and the target user, then renders resources/views/users/print.blade.php, which outputs assigned inventory names.
Proof of Concept
users.view.users.view-only user.GET /licenses
GET /accessories
GET /consumables
Observed for each:
HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
GET /users/<target-user-id> HTTP/1.1
Host: <snipe-it-host>
Cookie: snipeit_session=<attacker-session>
Observed:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
The response contained assigned inventory data from modules the attacker could not directly access, including license name, purchase order/order values, accessory name/note/cost, and consumable name/note/cost.
GET /users/<target-user-id>/print HTTP/1.1
Host: <snipe-it-host>
Cookie: snipeit_session=<attacker-session>
Observed:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
The response contained assigned inventory names.
Evidence
The users.view-only test account was confirmed to lack direct inventory permissions:
{
"has_users_view": true,
"has_licenses_view": false,
"has_accessories_view": false,
"has_consumables_view": false,
"has_assets_view": false
}
Direct access to /licenses, /accessories, and /consumables returned 403 Forbidden.
The same account received 200 OK from /users/<target-user-id> and the response included assigned inventory data that should have been protected by the corresponding inventory module permissions.
Negative Controls
Denied direct module responses did not include the test inventory strings. The same data was only disclosed through the user detail and user print views.
Impact
Organizations may use separate permissions to allow HR/helpdesk-style users to view people records without exposing license, accessory, or consumable inventories and cost/order metadata. This issue bypasses those module-specific permissions and leaks assigned inventory information through the user view.
Patches
Patched in 374f426f0c
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 8.6.1 (ecosystem)8.6.1
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0