@saltcorn/plugins-loader
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.0.0-beta.14(semver)
Fixed versions
1.0.0-beta.14
Fix
- Fixed version
1.0.0-beta.14npm install @saltcorn/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: None
@saltcorn/plugins-loader unsanitized plugin name leads to a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability when creating plugins using git source
Summary
When creating a new plugin using the git source, the user-controlled value req.body.name is used to build the plugin directory where the location will be cloned. The API used to execute the git clone command with the user-controlled data is child_process.execSync. Since the user-controlled data is not validated, a user with admin permission can add escaping characters and execute arbitrary commands, leading to a command injection vulnerability.
Details
Relevant code from source (req.body) to sink (child_process.execSync).
router.post(
"/",
isAdmin,
error_catcher(async (req, res) => {
const plugin = new Plugin(req.body); // [1]
[...]
try {
await load_plugins.loadAndSaveNewPlugin( // [3]
plugin,
schema === db.connectObj.default_schema || plugin.source === "github"
);
[...]
}
})
);
class Plugin {
[...]
constructor(o: PluginCfg | PluginPack | Plugin) {
[...]
this.name = o.name; // [2]
[...]
}
const loadAndSaveNewPlugin = async (plugin, force, noSignalOrDB) => {
[...]
const loader = new PluginInstaller(plugin); // [4]
const res = await loader.install(force); // [7]
[...]
};
class PluginInstaller {
constructor(plugin, opts = {}) {
[...]
const tokens =
plugin.source === "npm"
? plugin.location.split("/")
: plugin.name.split("/"); // [5]
[...]
this.tempDir = join(this.tempRootFolder, "temp_install", ...tokens); // [6]
[...]
}
async install(force) {
[...]
if (await this.prepPluginsFolder(force, pckJSON)) { // [8]
[...]
}
async prepPluginsFolder(force, pckJSON) {
[...]
switch (this.plugin.source) {
[...]
case "git":
if (force || !(await pathExists(this.pluginDir))) {
await gitPullOrClone(this.plugin, this.tempDir); // [9]
[...]
}
const gitPullOrClone = async (plugin, pluginDir) => {
[...]
if (fs.existsSync(pluginDir)) {
execSync(`git ${setKey} -C ${pluginDir} pull`);
} else {
execSync(`git ${setKey} clone ${plugin.location} ${pluginDir}`); // [10]
}
[...]
};
PoC
echo "hello">/tmp/HACKED does not exists:cat /tmp/HACKED
cat: /tmp/HACKED: No such file or directory
http://localhost:3000/plugins/new;echo "hello">/tmp/HACKED - Source: git - other fields blankCreateENOENT: no such file or directory, .... but the command touch /tmp/HACKED will be executedcat /tmp/HACKED
hello
Impact
Remote code execution
Recommended Mitigation
Sanitize the pluginDir value before passing to execSync. Alternatively, use child_process. execFileSync API (docs: https://nodejs.org/api/child_process.html#child_processexecfilesyncfile-args-options)
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 1.0.0-beta.14 (semver)1.0.0-beta.14
1.0.0-beta.14npm install @saltcorn/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0