open-webui
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.9.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
0.9.0
Fix
- Fixed version
0.9.0pip install --upgrade open-webui==0.9.0
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-44568, PYSEC-2026-2724
Open WebUI has Stored XSS in Pending User Overlay via Incorrect DOMPurify Application Order
Vulnerability Details
CWE-79: Cross-site Scripting (XSS)
The AccountPending.svelte component renders the admin-configured "Pending User Overlay Content" using marked.parse() inside {@html} with an incorrect DOMPurify application order:
Vulnerable Code
`src/lib/components/layout/Overlay/AccountPending.svelte` (lines 43-48):
{@html marked.parse(
DOMPurify.sanitize(
($config?.ui?.pending_user_overlay_content ?? '').replace(/\n/g, '<br>')
)
)}
DOMPurify is applied to the raw Markdown input before marked.parse() processes it. This is the wrong order. DOMPurify sanitizes the Markdown text (which contains no HTML tags), then marked.parse() converts Markdown link syntax into HTML <a> tags with javascript: href, and the result is rendered with {@html} unsanitized.
The correct pattern (used elsewhere in the codebase, e.g., NotebookView.svelte:77) is:
DOMPurify.sanitize(marked.parse(src)) // sanitize AFTER markdown parsing
Steps to Reproduce
Prerequisites
Steps
pending.# Account Pending
Your account is under review.
[Contact Support](javascript:alert(document.domain))
localhost (the document domain), confirming XSS execution.Verified Output
The alert(document.domain) executes successfully, displaying "localhost" in a JavaScript dialog box.
Impact
An admin can inject arbitrary JavaScript into the Pending User Overlay Content that executes in the browser context of any pending user who views the overlay page. This could be used to:
While this requires admin privileges to set the overlay content, it enables an admin to attack pending users (who have not yet been granted full access). In multi-admin deployments, a compromised admin account could use this to escalate attacks.
Proposed Fix
Apply DOMPurify after marked.parse(), not before:
<!-- Before (vulnerable): -->
{@html marked.parse(
DOMPurify.sanitize(
($config?.ui?.pending_user_overlay_content ?? '').replace(/\n/g, '<br>')
)
)}
<!-- After (fixed): -->
{@html DOMPurify.sanitize(
marked.parse(
($config?.ui?.pending_user_overlay_content ?? '').replace(/\n/g, '<br>'),
{ async: false }
)
)}
<img width="1510" height="1093" alt="2026-03-23_03-07" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/bcc94dd6-4f06-472b-9979-9759458c76b3" />
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 0.9.0 (ecosystem)0.9.0
0.9.0pip install --upgrade open-webui==0.9.0Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0