Details
Real-world consequences:
- Org reconnaissance — confirms existence of private projects, names, activity patterns; commit messages and branch names often reveal product plans, security fix windows, or release schedules.
- Insider-threat amplification — any contractor / interviewee / OSS contributor invited to a low-permission team can mine the rest of the org's CI history.
- Cross-team violation — when an org isolates internal projects via teams (e.g.
security/vsinfra/teams), this surface flatly bypasses that boundary. - Pivot data — commit SHAs disclosed here unlock subsequent endpoints that *do* check ACLs but accept SHA inputs (e.g. some package / archive download paths in third-party tooling that just trusts a SHA).
The same primitive is exposed regardless of token scope, as long as the token
has organization scope, the user is an org member, and the org has any
private repos with action runs.
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