Details
## Impact
An attacker who can repeatedly cause trie-node sync failures or timeouts during bootstrap can consume the bounded sync throttler until no capacity
remains.
Once enough slots are leaked:
- additional account-data trie sync attempts stop making progress
- the parent loop waits until context timeout
- SyncAccounts() fails
- epoch bootstrap fails
This is a core node availability issue. It affects fresh/restarting nodes and validators that need to bootstrap or resync state.
This is not a theoretical issue:
- StartSyncing() performs network-dependent trie-node retrieval
- it already has explicit timeout / failure paths
- the leaked throttler slots are confirmed by runtime PoC
## Recommended Fix
Release the slot with defer immediately after StartProcessing() and cancel the defer only if ownership is intentionally transferred, which is not the
case here.
Example fix pattern:
func (u *userAccountsSyncer) syncDataTrie(rootHash []byte, ssh data.SyncStatisticsHandler, ctx context.Context) error {
u.throttler.StartProcessing()
defer u.throttler.EndProcessing()
u.syncerMutex.Lock()
defer u.syncerMutex.Unlock()
if _, ok := u.dataTries[string(rootHash)]; ok {
return nil
}
dataTrie, err := trie.NewTrie(...)
if err != nil {
return err
}
trieSyncer, err := trie.NewTrieSyncer(arg)
if err != nil {
return err
}
u.trieSyncers[string(rootHash)] = trieSyncer
return trieSyncer.StartSyncing(rootHash, ctx)
}
The same pattern should be applied to:
- data/syncer/userAccountsSyncer.go
- data/syncer/kappAccountsSyncer.go
## References
- data/syncer/userAccountsSyncer.go
- data/syncer/kappAccountsSyncer.go
- data/trie/sync.go
- core/throttler/numGoRoutinesThrottler.go
- core/bootstrap/process.go
- SECURITY.md