Details
Attack-surface boundary (fs.protected_hardlinks)
On Linux with fs.protected_hardlinks=1 (default on modern distros), link(2) additionally requires the linking user to have READ + WRITE permission on the source file (per may_linkat() in the kernel). Verified on Ubuntu 24.04: as non-root, ln /etc/passwd /tmp/x returns EPERM, and the same via the oras PoC path returns link passwd /tmp/.../evil_passwd: operation not permitted.
So the attacker cannot use this bug to read arbitrary root-owned files (e.g., `/etc/shadow`) when the victim invokes `oras pull` as a regular user. The attack surface depends on the invocation context:
| Invocation context | Reachable file classes |
|---|---|
| oras pull run by a regular user | Any file the user OWNS or has write access to in the process CWD: .env, .git/config, .aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/config, project-local secrets, CI workspace files. |
| oras pull run as root (systemd without User=, container entrypoint default root, Kubernetes operator) | Every file on the host filesystem. /etc/shadow, /root/.ssh/id_rsa, bind-mounted host paths, service private keys. |
The user-context attack surface alone is sufficient for supply-chain-grade impact: CI pipelines and developer machines routinely hold API keys, signing keys, and cloud credentials in user-owned files in the working directory. The root-context escalation makes the bug Critical in mainstream Kubernetes/GitOps tooling where oras-go is adopted for artifact distribution.
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Proposed fix
Change ensureLinkPath to expose both the verbatim target (for symlinks) and the resolved absolute path (for hardlinks); have the TypeLink case use the resolved path.
// Current behavior preserved for TypeSymlink. TypeLink switches to the resolved
// path to avoid CWD-resolution mismatch at os.Link time.
func ensureLinkPath(baseAbs, baseRel, link, target string) (symlinkTarget, hardlinkPath string, err error) {
path := target
if !filepath.IsAbs(target) {
path = filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(link), target)
}
if _, err = resolveRelToBase(baseAbs, baseRel, path); err != nil {
return "", "", err
}
return target, path, nil
}
case tar.TypeLink:
var absTarget string
if _, absTarget, err = ensureLinkPath(dirPath, dirName, filePath, header.Linkname); err == nil {
err = os.Link(absTarget, filePath)
}
case tar.TypeSymlink:
var symTarget string
symTarget, _, err = ensureLinkPath(dirPath, dirName, filePath, header.Linkname)
if err != nil { return err }
if err = os.Symlink(symTarget, filePath); err != nil { ... }
Regression test to add:
Extend Test_extractTarDirectory_HardLink with a third sub-test that:
- Creates a sentinel file in the test's
t.TempDir()(or an explicitlyos.Chdir-entered directory) with a known name, e.g.sentinel.txt. - Builds a tarball containing a
TypeLinkentry withLinkname: "sentinel.txt"(relative). - Extracts.
- Asserts either
extractTarDirectoryreturned an error, OR the resulting hardlink's inode does NOT match the sentinel's inode.