Advisory

GHSA-fxhp-mv3v-67qp

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Attack-surface boundary (fs.protected_hardlinks)

On Linux with fs.protected_hardlinks=1 (default on modern distros), link(2) additionally requires the linking user to have READ + WRITE permission on the source file (per may_linkat() in the kernel). Verified on Ubuntu 24.04: as non-root, ln /etc/passwd /tmp/x returns EPERM, and the same via the oras PoC path returns link passwd /tmp/.../evil_passwd: operation not permitted.

So the attacker cannot use this bug to read arbitrary root-owned files (e.g., `/etc/shadow`) when the victim invokes `oras pull` as a regular user. The attack surface depends on the invocation context:

| Invocation context | Reachable file classes |
|---|---|
| oras pull run by a regular user | Any file the user OWNS or has write access to in the process CWD: .env, .git/config, .aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/config, project-local secrets, CI workspace files. |
| oras pull run as root (systemd without User=, container entrypoint default root, Kubernetes operator) | Every file on the host filesystem. /etc/shadow, /root/.ssh/id_rsa, bind-mounted host paths, service private keys. |

The user-context attack surface alone is sufficient for supply-chain-grade impact: CI pipelines and developer machines routinely hold API keys, signing keys, and cloud credentials in user-owned files in the working directory. The root-context escalation makes the bug Critical in mainstream Kubernetes/GitOps tooling where oras-go is adopted for artifact distribution.

---

Proposed fix

Change ensureLinkPath to expose both the verbatim target (for symlinks) and the resolved absolute path (for hardlinks); have the TypeLink case use the resolved path.

// Current behavior preserved for TypeSymlink. TypeLink switches to the resolved
// path to avoid CWD-resolution mismatch at os.Link time.
func ensureLinkPath(baseAbs, baseRel, link, target string) (symlinkTarget, hardlinkPath string, err error) {
    path := target
    if !filepath.IsAbs(target) {
        path = filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(link), target)
    }
    if _, err = resolveRelToBase(baseAbs, baseRel, path); err != nil {
        return "", "", err
    }
    return target, path, nil
}
case tar.TypeLink:
    var absTarget string
    if _, absTarget, err = ensureLinkPath(dirPath, dirName, filePath, header.Linkname); err == nil {
        err = os.Link(absTarget, filePath)
    }
case tar.TypeSymlink:
    var symTarget string
    symTarget, _, err = ensureLinkPath(dirPath, dirName, filePath, header.Linkname)
    if err != nil { return err }
    if err = os.Symlink(symTarget, filePath); err != nil { ... }

Regression test to add:

Extend Test_extractTarDirectory_HardLink with a third sub-test that:

  1. Creates a sentinel file in the test's t.TempDir() (or an explicitly os.Chdir-entered directory) with a known name, e.g. sentinel.txt.
  2. Builds a tarball containing a TypeLink entry with Linkname: "sentinel.txt" (relative).
  3. Extracts.
  4. Asserts either extractTarDirectory returned an error, OR the resulting hardlink's inode does NOT match the sentinel's inode.

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