github.com/nhost/nhost
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.0.0-20260330133707-294954e0fc3a(semver)
Fixed versions
0.0.0-20260330133707-294954e0fc3a
Fix
- Fixed version
0.0.0-20260330133707-294954e0fc3ago get github.com/nhost/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-34969, GO-2026-5388
Nhost Leaks Refresh Tokens via URL Query Parameter in OAuth Provider Callback
Refresh Token Leaked via URL Query Parameter in OAuth Provider Callback
Summary
The auth service's OAuth provider callback flow places the refresh token directly into the redirect URL as a query parameter. Refresh tokens in URLs are logged in browser history, server access logs, HTTP Referer headers, and proxy/CDN logs.
Note that the refresh token is one-time use and all of these leak vectors are on owned infrastructure or services integrated by the application developer.
Affected Component
github.com/nhost/nhostservices/authservices/auth/go/controller/sign_in_provider_callback_get.gosigninProviderProviderCallback (lines 257-261)Root Cause
In sign_in_provider_callback_get.go:257-261, after successful OAuth sign-in, the refresh token is appended as a URL query parameter:
if session != nil {
values := redirectTo.Query()
values.Add("refreshToken", session.RefreshToken)
redirectTo.RawQuery = values.Encode()
}
This results in a redirect like:
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://myapp.com/callback?refreshToken=a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890
Proof of Concept
Step 1: Initiate OAuth login
GET /signin/provider/github?redirectTo=https://myapp.com/callback
Step 2: Complete OAuth flow with provider
Step 3: Auth service redirects with token in URL
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://myapp.com/callback?refreshToken=a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890
Step 4: Token is now visible in owned infrastructure and services:
Browser History:
# User's browser history now contains the refresh token
HTTP Referer Header:
# If the callback page loads ANY external resource (image, script, etc.):
GET /resource.js HTTP/1.1
Host: cdn.example.com
Referer: https://myapp.com/callback?refreshToken=a1b2c3d4-e5f6-...
# Note: modern browsers default to strict-origin-when-cross-origin policy,
# which strips query parameters from cross-origin Referer headers.
# Additionally, the Referer is only sent to services integrated by the
# application developer (analytics, CDNs, etc.), not arbitrary third parties.
Server Access Logs:
# Reverse proxy, CDN, or load balancer logs on owned infrastructure:
2026-03-08 12:00:00 GET /callback?refreshToken=a1b2c3d4-e5f6-... 200
Step 5: Attacker uses stolen refresh token
# Exchange stolen refresh token for new access token
curl -X POST https://auth.nhost.run/v1/token \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"refreshToken": "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890"}'
# Note: refresh tokens are one-time use, so this only works if the
# legitimate client has not already consumed the token and if the attacker has
# compromised your infrastructure to get access to this information
Impact
Fix
Implemented PKCE (Proof Key for Code Exchange) for the OAuth flow. With PKCE, the authorization code cannot be exchanged without the code_verifier that only the original client possesses, preventing token misuse even if the URL is logged.
See: https://docs.nhost.io/products/auth/pkce/
Resources
Low Basis: The source's own band: LOW
0, fixed 0.0.0-20260330133707-294954e0fc3a (semver)0.0.0-20260330133707-294954e0fc3a
0.0.0-20260330133707-294954e0fc3ago get github.com/nhost/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0