Advisory

GHSA-g5vv-9gxw-82hx

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

$ python3 craft_malicious_repo.py /tmp/victim-repo 200000
Malicious commit sha : 2450fbd5ab5ebfff430dab183d25678df9fd20de
Payload size : 200000 bytes
git cat-file -t confirms: commit

$ python3 trigger_redos.py /tmp/victim-repo 2450fbd5ab5ebfff430dab183d25678df9fd20de
Accessing commit.author — triggers Actor._from_string()...
Author name length : 200014 chars
Elapsed : 150.488 seconds
RESULT: VULNERABLE

Docker reproduction (fully isolated environment):

docker run --rm -it -v ~/gitpython-poc:/work -w /work python:3.8-bookworm bash

# Inside the container:
apt-get update && apt-get install -y git
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython.git /work/GitPython
pip install -e /work/GitPython

python3 /work/poc/craft_malicious_repo.py /work/victim-repo 200000
# note the SHA printed, then:
python3 /work/poc/trigger_redos.py /work/victim-repo <SHA>

The python:3.8-bookworm base image matches the one used in GitPython's own
fuzzing/local-dev-helpers/Dockerfile.

---

Impact

Who is affected:

Any application that uses GitPython to parse commits from a source it does not
fully control. High-risk deployments include:

  • CI/CD systems (Jenkins, GitLab CI, GitHub Actions self-hosted runners, etc.) that clone and inspect third-party pull requests — one malicious commit in a PR can stall every worker that processes it.
  • Code-hosting or code-review web services that render commit author information — a single crafted push blocks every page render or API response that touches that commit's metadata.
  • Security or compliance scanners that walk repository history across many repositories — one crafted object in any repository exhausts a scanner worker.

Severity of impact:

A 200 KB author field blocks a process for ~150 seconds per single .author
access. When iter_commits() or blame are used, every commit in a history
traversal can be independently crafted, multiplying the total hang time by the
number of commits processed. There is no confidentiality or integrity impact —
this is a pure availability / resource-exhaustion vulnerability.

---

Suggested Fix

Replace the vulnerable pattern with one that cannot backtrack catastrophically.
The minimal, behavior-preserving fix is to exclude < and > from the name
group, removing the ambiguity that forces O(n²) backtracking:

# git/util.py, line 863
# Before (vulnerable):
name_email_regex = re.compile(r"(.*) <(.*?)>")

# After (fixed — identical output for all well-formed input):
name_email_regex = re.compile(r"([^<>]*) <([^<>]*)>")

Because the name group can no longer itself contain a < character, the engine
has exactly one candidate position to try when a closing > is absent — and fails
in O(n) time instead of O(n²). Legitimate actor strings (Name <email>) never
contain < or > in either field, so this change produces identical results for
all valid input.

As defense in depth, independently of the regex fix, bounding the maximum number
of characters GitPython will attempt to parse in an author/committer line (e.g.
rejecting strings longer than 4096 bytes before passing them to any regex) would
further limit the blast radius of any future ReDoS class in this parser.

Sources & licences